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Abstract
Quantum theory (QT) has been confirmed by numerous experiments, yet we still cannot fully grasp the
meaning of the theory. As a consequence, the quantum world appears to us paradoxical. Here we shed new
light on QT by being based on two main postulates:
1. the theory should be logically consistent;
2. inferences in the theory should be computable in polynomial time.
The first postulate is what we require to each well-founded mathematical theory. The computation postulate
defines the physical component of the theory. We show that the computation postulate is the only true divide
between QT, seen as a generalised theory of probability, and classical probability. All quantum paradoxes, and
entanglement in particular, arise from the clash of trying to reconcile a computationally intractable, somewhat
idealised, theory (classical physics) with a computationally tractable theory (QT) or, in other words, from
regarding physics as fundamental rather than computation.
1 Introduction
Quantum theory (QT) is one of the most fundamental, and accurate, mathematical descriptions of our physical
world. It dates back to the 1920s, and in spite of nearly one century passed by since its inception, we do not have
a clear understanding of such a theory yet. In particular, we cannot fully grasp its meaning: why the theory is
the way it is. As a consequence, we cannot come to terms with the many paradoxes it appears to lead to—the
so-called “quantum weirdness”.
Let us recall that QT is widely regarded as a “generalised” theory of probability. Since its foundation, there
have been two main ways to explain the differences between QT and classical probability. The first one goes
back to Birkhoff and von Neumann [1] and explains the differences with the premise that, in QT, the Boolean
algebra of events is taken over by the “quantum logic” of projection operators on a Hilbert space. The second
one is based on the view that the quantum-classical clash is due to the appearance of negative probabilities [2, 3].
More recently, the so-called “quantum reconstruction” research effort aims at rebuilding finite dimensional
QT from primitive postulates. The search for alternative axiomatisations of QT has been approached following
different avenues: extending Boolean logic [1, 4, 5], using operational primitives and/or information-theoretic
postulates (the so called “operational approach”)[6–21], starting from the phenomenon of quantum nonlocality
[9, 15, 16, 22, 23], the categorical approach [24–26] and building upon the (subjective) foundation of probability
[27–45]. The present work is particularly close to the latter approach, whose goal is to answer questions such as
[41]: What is the relationship of QT probability calculus to classical probability theory (CPT)? Is QT consistent
with CPT? Is it some kind of extension of CPT, and, if so, what is the nature and conceptual foundation of that
extension? Note that the different ways one can answer these questions critically depend on the used notion of
“being consistent”.
In trying to understand and explain QT, we share with the operational approach the aim of deriving the
mathematical structure of Hilbert spaces, but with two main differences.
Firstly, in the operational approach, the notions of measurement and outcome probability are primitive el-
ements of the theory, and therefore the emphasis is on the predictive aspect of QT—it aims at computing the
outcome probability. We instead take a different view and mainly focus on the explanatory aspect of QT, that is
on its being a (probabilistic) model of reality. Hence, from this perspective, in the process of modelling say a
Stern-Gerlach experiment, one does not start from the outcomes of the experiment but from (hidden) variables
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representing the “directions” of the particle’s spins, their domains (possibility space) and the functions of the
variables we can observe (observables) and are interested in (queries).
Secondly, in this work we do not aim at characterising QT has being the unique theory satisfying some set of
principles, or postulates. Instead, we aim at showing that ultimately QT appears to us to behave like it behaves
because, once the appropriate variables, possibility space, observables and queries are specified, it constitutes an
instance of a theory based on two simple postulates:
(Coherence) The theory should be logically consistent.
(Computation) Inferences in the theory should be computable in polynomial time.
The first postulate is what it is essentially required to each well-founded mathematical theory, be it physical or
not: to be based on a few axioms and rules from which we can unambiguously derive its mathematical truths.
The set of rules we refer to are at the foundation of CPT, and more generally of all rational choice theories [46]:
decision theory, game theory, social choice theory and market theory. In this setting the term logical consistency
has a very precise meaning: a theory is logically consistent (coherent) when it disallows “Dutch books” (“arbi-
trages” in market theory). In gambling terms, this means that a bettor on a experiment cannot be made a sure
loser by exploiting inconsistencies in her probabilistic assessments.
The second postulate is the central one. When seen through the prism of the coherence postulate, it tells us that
QT is just a computationally efficient version of CPT, or stated otherwise a theory of computational rationality.
In doing so, it explains why there are cases where QT is in agreement with CPT—that is precisely when infer-
ences in CPT can be computed in polynomial time—, and cases where QT cannot be reconciled with CPT—that
is precisely when inferences in CPT cannot be computed in polynomial time.
But there is more to it: the setting in which our results are proved applies to any theory satisfying the coher-
ence and computational postulates, and goes thence beyond the specific case of QT. As a consequence, Bell-like
inequalities and entanglement are shown to be phenomena that can arise in all theories of computational ratio-
nality, and are therefore not specific to QT. To illustrate this fact, we devise an example of a computationally
tractable theory of probability that is unrelated to QT but that admits entangled states. An example of Bell’s
like inequalities and entanglement with classical coins is given in [47]. Before listing our findings in detail, we
introduce the model framework we will consider in the rest of the paper.
1.1 Framework
The first step in defining a model is to explicit its variables, their domains (possibility space) and their functions
we can observe (observables).
Possibility space: For a single particle (n-level system), we consider the possibility space
Cn := {x ∈ Cn : x†x = 1}.
We can interpret an element x˜ ∈Cn as “input data” for some classical preparation procedure. For instance,
in the case of the spin-1/2 particle (n= 2), if θ = [θ1,θ2,θ3] is the direction of a filter in the Stern-Gerlach
experiment, then x˜ is its one-to-one mapping into Ω (apart from a phase term). For spin greater than 1/2,
the variable x˜ ∈ Cn cannot directly be interpreted in terms only of “filter direction”. Nevertheless, at least
on the formal level, x˜ can play the role of a “hidden variable” in our model and Cn of the possibility space
Ω. This hidden-variable model for QT was first introduced in [35, Sec. 1.7], where the author explains
why this model does not contradict the existing “no-go” theorems for hidden variables.
Cartesian product: More generally, we can consider composite systems of m particles, each one with n j de-
grees of freedom. The possibility space is then the Cartesian product
Ω=×mj=1Cn j . (1)
So far this framework is totally compatible with CPT, in fact we can define a classical probability distribution
over complex vectors. We can simply interpret Cn (and ×mj=1C
n j ) as a convenient feature space, similarly to the
Fourier domain (after the Fourier transform).
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Observables: An observable is given as a function of the variables of the model. But since observables are
problem dependent, we may restrict their collection to just a subspace of all possible such functions. In
case of a single particle, observables correspond to quadratic forms:
g(x) = x†Gx, (2)
with G ∈H n×n (H n×n being the set of n×n Hermitian matrices). For m particles, we have that:
g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j), (3)
with G∈H n×n, n=∏mj=1 n j and where⊗ denotes the tensor product between vectors regarded as column
matrices.
Note that Expression (3), and thus the use of the tensor product in composite systems, can be justified
based on Expressions (1) and (2). The argument goes roughly as follows (for a more in depth discussion see
Section 6.3). In the theory of probability, structural judgements such as independence, are defined on product of
observables on the single variables, e.g., two variables X ,Y are independent iff E[ f (X)g(X)] = E[ f (X)]E[g(Y )]
for all f ,g, where E[·] denotes the expectation operator. In the specific case we are considering, the product of
observables have the form ∏mj=1 x
†
jG jx j. Now, it is not difficult to verify that such product is mathematically the
same as (⊗mj=1x j)†(⊗mj=1G j)(⊗mj=1x j). By closing the set of product gambles under the operations of addition
and scalar (real number) multiplication, we get the vector space whose domain coincide with the collection of
gambles of the form as in (3). Hence, in the framework advanced in the present work, the tensor product is
ultimately a derived notion, not a primitive one.
Again, notice that up to here we are still fully in agreement with CPT.
1.2 Quantum weirdness
Since CPT can be defined over complex vectors (the possibility space in CPT can be any set), what originates the
“quantum weirdness” cannot be the use of complex numbers (vectors). In this paper, we show that the “quantum
weirdness” comes from the postulate of computation.
The inference problem, that is the problem of deciding whether a certain claim, or judgement, follows from
a given set of assessments, is in general undecidable in CPT, whereas it is NP-hard when we restrict inferences
to observables satisfying (3).
If we impose the additional postulate of computation, the theory becomes one of “computational rationality”:
one that is consistent (or coherent), up to the degree that polynomial computation allows. QT coincides with
such a weaker, and hence more general, theory of probability. Moreover, the mathematical structure of
Hilbert space usually associated with QT can be seen as a consequence of the adoption of such postulate.
As it will be made clear in what follows, the point is that for a subject living inside QT, all is coherent. Instead,
for another subject, living in the classical, and somewhat idealised, probabilistic world (hence not subject to the
computation postulate), QT displays some inconsistencies: precisely those that cannot be fixed in polynomial
time. All quantum paradoxes, and entanglement in particular, arise from the clash of these two world views: i.e.,
from trying to reconcile an unrestricted theory (i.e., classical physics) with a theory of computational rationality
(quantum theory), or, in other words, from regarding our common-sense notion of physics as fundamental rather
than computation.
There is more, we highlight our findings in the following list.
ρ as a moment matrix: Requiring the computation postulate is tantamount to defining a probabilistic model
using only a finite number of moments, and therefore, implicitly, to defining the model as the set of all
probabilities1 compatible with the given moments.
Imprecise Probability: A probability is not uniquely defined by a finite number of moments. Therefore, QT
can be shown to be “generalised” also in another direction, as it is a theory of “imprecise” probability.
Continuous Probability: Since the possibility spaceΩ is infinite with probabilities we mean continuous proba-
bilities. In our context this explains why the set of states in QT has infinite extremes and, why determining
whether a state is entangled or not is NP-hard.
1Note that here we use ‘probabilities’ to mean finitely additive probabilities, alternatively called also ‘probability charges’ (the term
‘distribution’ is usually restricted to σ -additive probabilities, and therefore it would be misplaced in the present context).
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Signed Probabilities: In QT, some of these compatible probabilities can actually be signed, that is, they allow
for “negative probabilities”, which have no intrinsic meaning beyond the fact of constituting a compatible
probabilistic model.
n-level single particle system: We show that QT is always compatible with CPT (classical and computational
rationality agree).
CHSH experiment We show that the witness function in the CHSH experiment is nothing else than a negative
function whose negativity cannot be assessed in polynomial time, whence it is not “negative” in QT.
Entanglement Witness Theorem: We reformulate the Entanglement Witness Theorem in terms of classical
rationality versus computational rationality.
Entanglement outside QT: We devise an example of a computationally tractable theory of probability that is
unrelated to QT but that admits entangled states.
Tensor Product: It is a derived notion in our context. We use computational rationality to explain why it has a
central role in the standard axiomatisation of QT.
1.3 Outline of the paper
Section 2 is concerned with the coherence principle. We recall how probability can be derived (via mathematical
duality) from a set of simple logical axioms. Addressing consistency (coherence or rationality) in such a setting
is a standard task in logic; in practice, it reduces to prove that a certain real-valued bounded function is non-
negative.
Section 2.1 details the computation postulate. We consider the problem of verifying the non-negativity of a
function as above. This problem is generally undecidable or, when decidable, NP-hard. We make the problem
polynomially solvable by redefining the meaning of (non-)negativity. We give our fundamental theorem (Theo-
rem 1) showing that the redefinition is at the heart of the clash between classical probability and computational
rationality.
We show in Section 3 that QT is a special instance of computational rationality and hence that Theorem 1
is not only the sole difference between quantum and classical probability, but also the distinctive reason for all
quantum paradoxes; this latter part is discussed in Section 4. In particular, to give further insight about the
quantum-classical clash, in Section 4.1 we reconsider the question of local realism in the light of computational
rationality; in Section 4.2 we show that the witness function, in the fundamental “entanglement witness theorem”,
is nothing else than a negative function whose negativity cannot be assessed in polynomial time—whence it is
not “negative” in QT.
Moreover, using Theorem 1, in Section 5 we devise an example of a computationally tractable theory of
probability that is unrelated to QT but that admits entangled states. This shows in addition that the “quantum
logic” and the “quasi-probability” foundations of QT are two faces of the same coin, being natural consequences
of the computation principle.
We finally discuss the results in Section 7 and compare our approach to QBism and the operational recon-
structions.
2 Coherence postulate
De Finetti’s subjective foundation of probability [48] is based on the notion of rationality (consistency or co-
herence). This approach has then been further developed in [49, 50], giving rise to the so-called theory of
desirable gambles (TDG). This is an equivalent reformulation of the well-known Bayesian decision theory (a` la
Anscombe-Aumann [51]) once it is extended to deal with incomplete preferences [52, 53]. In this setting proba-
bility is a derived notion in the sense that it can be inferred via mathematical duality from a set of logical axioms
that one can interpret as rationality requirements in the way a subject, let us call her Alice, accepts gambles on
the results of an uncertain experiment. It goes as follows.
Let Ω denote the possibility space of an experiment (e.g., {Head,Tail} or Cn in QT). A gamble g on Ω is a
bounded real-valued function of Ω, interpreted as an uncertain reward. It plays the traditional role of variables
or, using a physical parlance, of observables. In the context we are considering, accepting a gamble g by an
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agent is regarded as a commitment to receive, or pay (depending on the sign), g(ω) utiles (abstract units of
utility, we can approximately identify it with money provided we deal with small amounts of it [54, Sec. 3.2.5])
whenever ω occurs. If by L we denote the set of all the gambles on Ω, the subset of all non-negative gambles,
that is, of gambles for which Alice never loses utiles, is given by L ≥ := {g ∈ L : infg ≥ 0}. Analogously,
negative gambles, those gambles for which Alice will certainly lose some utiles, even an epsilon, is defined as
L < := {g ∈L : supg < 0}. In what follows, with G := {g1,g2, . . . ,g|G |} ⊂L we denote a finite set of gambles
that Alice finds desirable (we will comment on the case when G may not be finite): these are the gambles that
she is willing to accept and thus commits herself to the corresponding transactions.
The crucial question is now to provide a criterion for a set G of gambles representing assessments of desir-
ability to be called rational. Intuitively Alice is rational if she avoids sure losses: that is, if, by considering the
implications of what she finds desirable, she is not forced to find desirable a negative gamble. This postulate of
rationality is called “no arbitrage” in economics and “no Dutch book” in the subjective foundation of probabil-
ity. In TDG we formulate it through the notion of logical consistency which, despite the informal interpretation
given above, is a purely syntactical (structural) notion. To show this, we need to define an appropriate logical
calculus (characterising the set of gambles that Alice must find desirable as a consequence of having desired G
in the first place) and based on it to characterise the family of consistent sets of assessments.
For the former, since non-negative gambles may increase Alice’s utility without ever decreasing it, we first
have that:
A0. L ≥ should always be desirable.
This defines the tautologies of the calculus. Moreover, whenever f ,g are desirable for Alice, then any positive
linear combination of them should also be desirable (this amounts to assuming that Alice has a linear utility
scale, which is a standard assumption in probability). Hence the corresponding deductive closure of a set G is
given by:
A1. K := posi(L ≥∪G ).
Here “posi” denotes the conic hull operator.2 When G is not finite, A1 requires in addition that K is closed.
In the betting interpretation given above, a sure loss for an agent is represented by a negative gamble. We
therefore say that:
Definition 1 (Coherence postulate). A set K of desirable gambles is coherent if and only if
A2. L <∩K= /0.
Note that K is incoherent if and only if −1 ∈K; therefore −1 can be regarded as playing the role of the Falsum
and A2 can be reformulated as −1 /∈K, see Appendix S.1. An example that gives an intuition of the postulates
is given in Figure 1.
Postulate A2, which presupposes postulates A0 and A1, provides the normative definition of TDG, referred to
by T. Moreover, as simple as it looks, alone it captures the coherence postulate as formulated in the Introduction
in case of classical probability theory. To see this, assumeK is coherent. We giveK a probabilistic interpretation
by observing that the mathematical dual of K is the closed convex set:
P =
{
µ ∈ S
∣∣∣∫
Ω
g(ω)dµ(ω)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ G
}
, (4)
where S = {µ ∈M | infµ ≥ 0, ∫ω dµ(ω) = 1} is the set of all probability charges in Ω, and M the set of all
charges (a charge is a finitely additive signed-measure) onΩ. The derivations are given in Appendix S.3. Observe
that the term “charge” is used in Analysis to denote a finitely additive set function [55, Ch.11]. Conversely a
measure is a countably additive set function.3 In this paper we use charges to be more general, but this does not
really matter for the results about QT that we are going to present later on. Hence, whenever an agent is coherent,
Equation (4) states that desirability corresponds to non-negative expectation (that is
∫
Ω g(ω)dµ(ω) ≥ 0 for all
probabilities inP). WhenK is incoherent,P turns out to be empty—there is no probability compatible with the
assessments in K. Stated otherwise, satisfying the axioms of classical probability—that is being a non-negative
function that integrates to one— is tantamount of being in the dual of a set K satisfying the coherence postulate
A2.
2The conic hull of a set of gambles A is defined as posi(A ) = {∑i λigi : λi ∈ R≥,gi ∈L }.
3De Finetti considered only finite additive probabilities, while Kolmogorov considered sigma additive probabilities.
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Figure 1: How tall was Albert Einstein? Do you want to bet on it? Let us denote Einstein’s height with x and
consider the possibility space Ω = [1.5,2]m. A gamble g is a bounded function from Ω to the real numbers, an
example in Plot (a). The meaning of g is as follows: if you accept g then you for instance commit yourself to
receive 0.75 utiles if x = 1.8m; to lose 0.75 utiles if x = 1.63m etc., Plot (b).
A0 says that, if you are rational, you should accept any gamble in Plot (c) because, no matter Einstein’s height,
they may increase your wealth without ever decreasing it, that is all gambles with g(x) ≥ 0. Similarly, you
should avoid any gamble in Plot (d) that will surely decrease your wealth, that is with gi < 0 (this follows by
A2), Plot (d). Tautologies (L ≥ = {g : g ≥ 0}) and Falsum (L < = {g : g < 0}) are depicted in green and,
respectively, red colours in Plot (e). Assume you have accepted all gambles in the green area and the two
gambles g1,g2, Plot (f). Note that, the acceptance of g1,g2 depends on your beliefs about Einstein’s height. If
you accept g1,g2 then you should also accept: (i) g1(x)+ g2(x) Plot (g); (ii) all the gambles λ1g1(x)+λ2g2(x)
for any λi ≥ 0 Plot (h); (iii) all gambles λ1g1(x)+λ2g2(x)+h(x) with λi ≥ 0 and h ∈L ≥, Plot (i). Plots (g)–(i)
follow by A1. Assume that instead of Plot (f), you have accepted the green area and g1,g2 in Plot (j). Then, you
must also accept g1 +g2 (because of A1). However, g1 +g2 is always negative, green function in Plot (k). You
always lose utiles in this case. In other words, by accepting g1,g2 you incur a sure loss—A2 is violated and so
you are irrational.
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2.1 Computation postulate
The problem of checking whether K is coherent or not can be formulated as the following decision problem:
∃λi ≥ 0 :−1−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈L ≥. (5)
If the answer is “yes”, then the gamble −1 belongs to K, proving K’s incoherence. Actually any inference task
can ultimately be reduced to a problem of the form (5), as discussed in Appendix S.2. Hence, the above decision
problem unveils a crucial fact: the hardness of inference in classical probability corresponds to the hardness of
evaluating the non-negativity of a function in the considered space (let us call this the “non-negativity decision
problem”).
When Ω is infinite (in this paper we consider the case Ω⊂ Cn) and for generic functions, the non-negativity
decision problem is undecidable. To avoid such an issue, we may impose restrictions on the class of allowed
gambles and thus define T on a appropriate subspaceLR ofL (see Appendix S.5). For instance, instead ofL ,
we may consider LR: the class of multivariate polynomials of degree at most d (we denote by L ≥R ⊂LR the
subset of non-negative polynomials and by L <R ⊂ LR the negative ones). In doing so, by Tarski-Seidenberg
quantifier elimination theory [56, 57], the decision problem becomes decidable, but still intractable, being in
general NP-hard.4 If we accept that P6=NP and we require that inference should be tractable (in P), we are stuck.
What to do? The solution, as advocated in this paper, is to change the meaning of “being non-negative” for a
function by considering a subset Σ≥ (L ≥R for which the membership problem in (5) is in P.
In other words, a computationally efficient TDG, which we denote by T?, should be based on a logical
redefinition of the tautologies, i.e., by stating that
B0. Σ≥ should always be desirable,
in the place of A0. The rest of the theory can develop following the footprints of T. In particular, the deductive
closure for T? is defined by:
B1. C := posi(Σ≥∪G ).
And the coherence postulate, which now naturally encompasses the computation postulate, states that:
Definition 2 (P-coherence). A set C of desirable gambles is P-coherent if and only if
B2. Σ<∩C= /0,
where Σ< = Interior(−Σ≥).
P-coherence owes its name to the fact that, whenever Σ≥ contains all positive constant gambles, B2 can be
checked in polynomial time by solving:
∃λi ≥ 0 such that −1−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈ Σ≥, (6)
where −1 denotes the constant function f ∈LR such that f (ω) =−1 for all ω ∈Ω.
Hence, T? and T have the same deductive apparatus; they just differ in the considered set of tautologies, and
thus in their (in)consistencies. An example that gives an intuition of the postulates is given in Figure 2.
Interestingly, as we did previously, we can associate a “probabilistic” interpretation to the calculus defined
by B0–B2 by computing the dual of a P-coherent set. Since LR is a topological vector space, we can consider
its dual spaceL ∗R of all bounded linear functionals L :LR→R. Hence, with the additional condition that linear
functionals preserve the unitary gamble, the dual cone of a P-coherent C⊂LR is given by
C◦ = {L ∈L ∗R | L(g)≥ 0, L(1) = 1, ∀g ∈ C} . (7)
To C◦ we can then associate its extension C• in M , that is, the set of all charges on Ω extending an element in
C◦. In other words, we can attempt to write L(g) as an “expectation”, that is an integral with respect to a charge,
4By Stone-Weierstrass theorem, multivariate-polynomials are dense in the space of continuous function in [0,1]n. Therefore,
multivariate-polynomials are a good choice forLR because they guarantee both expressiveness and decidability.
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Figure 2: Let us consider again Einstein’s height example. Assume we can split the nonnegative gambles
(tautologies) in two groups: (i) the ones whose nonnegativity can be assessed in polynomial time (orange colour
in Plot (a)); (ii) the ones whose nonnegativity cannot be assessed in polynomial time (blue colour in Plot (a)).
If you are a computationally rational agent, then you should surely accept all the orange gambles: they are
nonnegative and you can evaluate their nonnegativity in polynomial time. P-coherence demands that you should
accept all nonnegative orange gambles, Plot (b), and avoid all negative orange gambles, Plot (c). Assume that
you have accepted all nonnegative orange gambles and g1 (red), g2 (green) in Plot (d). Then, you must also
accept g1 +g2 (because of B1). Note that, g1 +g2 is always negative. However, according to P-coherence, you
are (computationally) irrational only if g1 +g2 is of type orange, that is if you can evaluate in polynomial time
that g1 + g2 is negative, Plot (d). In case g1 + g2 is of type blue Plot (e), although you are accepting a gamble
that is negative, you are not computationally irrational. The reason is that you may not be able to evaluate its
negativity. We will see that all “quantum paradoxes” arise when we are in a situation like Plot (e).
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i.e., L(g) =
∫
Ω g(ω)dµ(ω). In general however this set does not yield a classical probabilistic interpretation to
T?. This is because, whenever Σ< (L <R , there are negative gambles that cannot be proved to be negative in
polynomial time:
Theorem 1. Assume that Σ≥ includes all positive constant gambles and that it is closed (inLR). Let C⊆LR be
a P-coherent set of desirable gambles. The following statements are equivalent:
1. C includes a negative gamble that is not in Σ<.
2. posi(L ≥∪G ) is incoherent, and thusP is empty.
3. C◦ is not (the restriction toLR of) a closed convex set of mixtures of classical evaluation functionals.5
4. The extension C• of C◦ in the spaceM of all charges in Ω includes only charges that are not probabilities
(they have some negative value).
Theorem 1 is the central result of this paper (the proof is in Appendix S.6). It states that whenever C includes a
negative gamble (item 1), there is no classical probabilistic interpretation for it (item 2). The other points suggest
alternative solutions to overcome this deadlock: either to change the notion of evaluation functional (item 3) or
to use quasi-probabilities (probability distributions that admit negative values) as a means for interpreting T?
(item 4). The latter case means that, when we write L(g) =
∫
Ω g(ω)dµ(ω), then µ(ω) satisfies 1 = L(1) =∫
Ω dµ(ω) = 1 but it is not a probability charge.
In what follows, we are going to show that QT can be deduced from a particular instance of the theory T?.
As a consequence, we get that the computation postulate, and in particular B0, is the unique reason for all its
paradoxes, which all boil down to a rephrasing of the various statements of Theorem 1 in the considered quantum
context.
3 QT as computational rationality
We briefly recall the framework discussed in the Introduction. Consider first a single particle system with n-
degrees of freedom and
Cn := {x ∈ Cn : x†x = 1}.
We can interpret an element x˜ ∈Cn as “input data” for some classical preparation procedure. For instance, in the
case of the spin-1/2 particle (n= 2), if θ = [θ1,θ2,θ3] is the direction of a filter in the Stern-Gerlach experiment,
then x˜ is its one-to-one mapping into C2 (apart from a phase term). For spin greater than 1/2, the variable x˜ ∈Cn
cannot directly be interpreted in terms only of “filter direction”. Nevertheless, at least on the formal level, x˜ plays
the role of a “hidden variable” in our model and Cn of the possibility space Ω. This hidden-variable model for
QT is also discussed in [35, Sec. 1.7], where the author explains why this model does not contradict the existing
“no-go” theorems for hidden-variables, see also Section 6.2 and 6.3.
In QT any real-valued observable is described by a Hermitian operator. This naturally imposes restrictions
on the type of functions g in (5):
g(x) = x†Gx,
where x ∈ Ω and G ∈H n×n, with H n×n being the set of Hermitian matrices of dimension n× n. Since G is
Hermitian and x is bounded (x†x = 1), g is a real-valued bounded function (g(x) = 〈x|G|x〉 in bra-ket notation).
More generally speaking, we can consider composite systems of m particles, each one with n j degrees of
freedom. The possibility space is the Cartesian product Ω=×mj=1C
n j and the functions are m-quadratic forms:
g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j), (8)
with G ∈H n×n, n = ∏mj=1 n j and where ⊗ denotes the tensor product between vectors regarded as column
matrices. Notice that in our setting the tensor product is ultimately a derived notion, not a primitive one (see
Section 6.3), as it follows by the properties of m-quadratic forms.
5Here “closed” is with respect to the weak∗-topology, that is the coarsest topology on the dual space making the evaluation functions
continuous. Note also that evaluation functionals or, more in general the elements of the dual space, can be informally interpreted as
simply states.
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For m= 1 (a single particle), evaluating the non-negativity of the quadratic form x†Gx boils down to checking
whether the matrix G is Positive Semi-Definite (PSD) and therefore can be performed in polynomial time. This
is no longer true for m ≥ 2: indeed, in this case there exist polynomials of type (8) that are non-negative, but
whose matrix G is indefinite (it has at least one negative eigenvalue). Moreover, it turns out that problem (5) is
not tractable:
Proposition 1 ([58]). The problem of checking the non-negativity of functions of type (8) is NP-hard for m≥ 2.
What to do? As discussed previously, the solution is to change the meaning of “being non-negative” by
considering a subset Σ≥ (L ≥ for which the membership problem, and thus (5), is in P. For functions of type
(8), we can extend the notion of non-negativity that holds for a single particle to m > 1 particles:
Σ≥ := {g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) : G≥ 0}. (9)
That is, the function is “non-negative” whenever G is PSD (note that Σ≥ is the so-called cone of Hermitian
sum-of-squares polynomials, see Section 6.4, and that, in Σ≥ the non-negative constant functions have the form
g(x1, . . . ,xm) = c(⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j) with c≥ 0). Now, consider any set of desirable gambles C satisfying B0–
B2 with the given definition of (9): Eureka! We have just derived the first postulate of QT (see Postulate 1 in
[59, p. 110]):
Associated to any isolated physical system is a complex vector space with inner product (that is,
a Hilbert space) known as the state space of the system. The system is completely described by
its density operator, which is a positive operator ρ with trace one, acting on the state space of the
system.
Indeed, let G be a finite set of assessments, and K the deductive closure as defined by B1; it is not difficult
to prove that the dual of K is
Q= {ρ ∈ S | Tr(Gρ)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ G }, (10)
where S = {ρ ∈H n×n | ρ ≥ 0, Tr(ρ) = 1} is the set of all density matrices. As before, whenever the set
C representing Alice’s beliefs about the experiment is coherent, Equation (10) means that desirability implies
non-negative “expected value” for all models in Q. Note that in QT the expectation of g is Tr(Gρ). This follows
by Born’s rule, a law giving the probability that a measurement on a quantum system will yield a given result.
The agreement with Born’s rule is an important constraint in any alternative axiomatisation of QT. This is
also the case of our theory, but in the sense that Born’s rule can be derived from it. In fact, in the view of a
density matrix as a dual operator, ρ is formally equal to
ρ = L
(
(⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†
)
, (11)
with L defined in (6).
Example 1. Consider the case n = m = 2, then
L
(
(⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†
)
= L

 x11x
†
11x21x
†
21 x
†
11x12x21x
†
21 x11x
†
11x
†
21x22 x
†
11x12x
†
21x22
x11x
†
12x21x
†
21 x12x
†
12x21x
†
21 x11x
†
12x
†
21x22 x12x
†
12x
†
21x22
x11x
†
11x21x
†
22 x
†
11x12x21x
†
22 x11x
†
11x22x
†
22 x
†
11x12x22x
†
22
x11x
†
12x21x
†
22 x12x
†
12x21x
†
22 x11x
†
12x22x
†
22 x12x
†
12x22x
†
22

 , (12)
and so ρ11 = L(x11x†11x21x
†
21), ρ12 = L(x
†
11x12x21x
†
21) etc..
Hence, when a projection-valued measurement characterised by the projectors Π1, . . . ,Πn is considered, it
holds that
L((⊗mj=1x j)†Πi(⊗mj=1x j)) = Tr(ΠiL((⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†)) = Tr(Πiρ).
Since Πi ≥ 0 and the polynomials (⊗mj=1x j)†Πi(⊗mj=1x j) for i = 1, . . . ,n form a partition of unity, i.e.:
n
∑
i=1
(⊗mj=1x j)†Πi(⊗mj=1x j) = (⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j) = 1,
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we have that
Tr(Πiρ) ∈ [0,1] and
n
∑
i=1
Tr(Πiρ) = 1.
For this reason, Tr(Πiρ) is usually interpreted as a probability. But the projectors Πi’s are not indicator func-
tions, whence, strictly speaking, the traditional interpretation is incorrect. This can be seen clearly in the special
case where postulates A0 and B0 coincide, as in the case of a single particle, that is, where the theory can be
given a classical probabilistic interpretation, see Section 3.1. In such a case, the corresponding ρ is just a (trun-
cated) moment matrix, i.e., one for which there is at least one probability such that E[xx†] = ρ . In summary, our
standpoint here is that Tr(Πiρ) should rather be interpreted as the expectation of the m-quadratic form x†Πix.
This makes quite a difference with the traditional interpretation since in our case there can be (and usually there
will be) more than one charge compatible with such an expectation, as we will point out more precisely later on.
Quantum measurements are discrete: when we perform a measurement, we observe a detection (along one
of the directions Πi). This phenomenon of quantisation is one of the major differences between quantum and
classical physics. We took it into account in the choice of the framework, the possibility space being (only)
the “directions” of the particle’s spins and the measurement apparatus sensing only certain fixed “directions”
(x†Πix = x†viv†i x is a function of two “directions” x and vi). Despite its centrality, we want however to point
out that quantisation is not the source of Bell-like inequalities and entanglement. As said before, this is because
“quantum weirdness” is intrinsic to any theory of computational rationality, and is thence not confined to QT
only.
Remark 1. It is often claimed that QT includes classical probability theory (CPT) as a special case, or better
that QT includes discrete CPT. In the present framework, this is due to properties of quadratic forms. Indeed
x†Π1x, . . . ,x†Πnx form a partition of unity, and therefore E[x†Πix] = Tr(Πiρ) = pi, whenever ρ = E[xx†] =
∑ni=1 piΠi (with pi ≥ 0 and ∑ni=1 pi = 1).
On the contrary, as the possibility space Ω is infinite (e.g., the “directions” of the particle’s spins), in this paper
when we speak about CPT (and compare it with QT), we mean continuous classical probability theory (in the
complex numbers). Hence again, since both B1,B2 and A1,A2 are the same logical postulates parametrised
by the appropriate meaning of “being negative/non-negative”, the only axiom truly separating (continuous)
classical probability theory from the quantum one is B0 (with the specific form of (9)), thus implementing the
requirement of computational efficiency.
In other words, we claim that QT is “easier” than CPT because, as the possibility space Ω is infinite, inference
in continuous CPT is NP-hard. In QT, we realize that, when we try to address the question whether or not an
experimentally generated state is entangled (many quantum technologies rely on the presence of entanglement).
We will discuss in Section 4 that determining entanglement of a general state is equivalent to prove the non-
negativity of a polynomial that, as we discussed in Proposition 1, is NP-hard. In fact, we can reformulate the
Entanglement Witness Theorem as the clash between the classical notion of coherence and P-coherence, see
Theorem 2.
By providing a connection between the present work and [44], in Section 6.5.1 we discuss how to get the
other postulates and rules of QT: Lu¨ders rule (measurement updating) and Schro¨dinger rule (time evolution).
3.1 Truncated moment matrices vs. density matrices
In a single particle system of dimension n, ρ = L(xx†). In such case, ρ can be interpreted as a truncated moment
matrix, i.e., there exists a probability distribution on the complex vector variable x ∈Ω such that
ρ =
∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ(x). (13)
In fact, consider the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the density matrix:
ρ =
n
∑
i=1
λiviv†i ,
with λi ≥ 0 and vi ∈ Cn being orthonormal. We can define the probability distribution
µ(x) =
n
∑
i=1
λiδvi(x),
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where δvi is an atomic charge (Dirac’s delta) on vi. Then it is immediate to verify that∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ(x) =
n
∑
i=1
λiviv†i = ρ.
Note also that, a truncated moment matrix does not uniquely define a probability distribution, i.e., for a given ρ
there may exist two probability distributions µ1(x) 6= µ2(x) such that
ρ =
∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ1(x) =
∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ2(x).
This means that, if we interpret ρ as a truncated moment matrix and thus defining via (13) a closed convex set
of probabilities (more precisely charges), QT is a theory of imprecise probability [50]. We will discuss more
on this topic in Appendix 6.2. In fact, Karr [60] has proved that the set of probabilities, which are feasible for
the truncated moment constraint, e.g., ρ = L(xx†), is convex and compact with respect to the weak∗-topology.
Moreover, the extreme points of this set are probabilities that have at finite number of distinct points of support
(e.g., they are finite mixtures of Dirac’s deltas). A similar characterisation for POVM measurements is discussed
in the QT context in [61].
However, we have clarified that for m > 1 particles, ρ can be interpreted as a truncated moment matrix only
when C = {(⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) : Tr(Gρ) ≥ 0}, the P-coherent set of desirable gambles associated to ρ , does
not satisfy the first condition of Theorem 1. More discussions on this point are presented in the next sections.
4 Entanglement
Entanglement is usually presented as a characteristic of QT. In this section we are going to show that it is actually
an immediate consequence of computational tractability, meaning that entanglement phenomena are not confined
to QT but can be observed in other contexts too. An example of a non-QT entanglement is provided in Section 5.
To illustrate the emergence of entanglement from P-coherence, we verify that the set of desirable gambles
whose dual is an entangled density matrix ρe includes a negative gamble that is not in Σ<, and thus, although
being logically coherent, it cannot be given a classical probabilistic interpretation.
In what follows we focus only on bipartite systems ΩA×ΩB, with n = m = 2. The results are nevertheless
general.
Let (x,y) ∈ ΩA×ΩB, where x = [x1,x2]T and y = [y1,y2]T . We aim at showing that there exists a gamble
h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y) satisfying:
Tr(Hρe)≥ 0 and
h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y)< 0 for all (x,y) ∈ΩA×ΩB.
(14)
The first inequality says that h is desirable in T?. That is, h is a gamble desirable to Alice whose beliefs are
represented by ρe. The second inequality says that h is negative and, therefore, leads to a sure loss in T. By B0–
B2, the inequalities in (14) imply that H must be an indefinite Hermitian matrix.
Assume that n = m = 2 and consider the entangled density matrix:
ρe =
1
2

1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
 ,
and the Hermitian matrix:
H =

0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
0.0 −2.0 1.0 0.0
0.0 1.0 −2.0 0.0
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 .
This matrix is indefinite (its eigenvalues are {1,−1,−1,−3}) and is such that Tr(Hρe) = 1. Since Tr(Hρe)≥ 0,
the gamble
(x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y) =−2x1x†1y2y†2+ x1x†2y1y†2+ x1x†2y†1y2+ x†1x2y1y†2+ x†1x2y†1y2−2x2x†2y1y†1, (15)
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is desirable for Alice in T?.
Let xi = xia + ιxib and yi = yia + ιyib with xia,xib,yia,yib ∈ R, for i = 1,2, denote the real and imaginary
components of x,y. Then
(x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y) =−2x21ay22a−2x21ay22b+4x1ax2ay1ay2a+4x1ax2ay1by2b
−2x21by22a−2x21by22b+4x1bx2by1ay2a+4x1bx2by1by2b
−2x22ay21a−2x22ay21b−2x22by21a−2x22by21b
=− (
√
2x1ay2a−
√
2x2ay1a)2− (
√
2x1ay2b−
√
2x2ay1b)2
− (
√
2x1by2b−
√
2x2by1b)2− (
√
2x2by1a−
√
2x2ay1b)2 < 0.
(16)
This is the essence of the quantum puzzle: C is P-coherent but (Theorem 1) there is no P associated to it
and therefore, from the point of view of a classical probabilistic interpretation, it is not coherent (in any classical
description of the composite quantum system, the variables x,y appear to be entangled in a way unusual for
classical subsystems).
As previously mentioned, there are two possible ways out from this impasse: to claim the existence of either
non-classical evaluation functionals or of negative probabilities. Let us examine them in turn.
(1) Existence of non-classical evaluation functionals: From an informal betting perspective, the effect of a
quantum experiment on h(x,y) is to evaluate this polynomial to return the payoff for Alice. By Theorem 1,
there is no compatible classical evaluation functional, and thus in particular no value of the variables
x,y ∈ ΩA×ΩB, such that h(x,y) = 1. Hence, if we adopt this point of view, we have to find another,
non-classical, explanation for h(x,y) = 1. The following evaluation functional, denoted as ev(·), may do
the job:
ev


x1y1
x2y1
x1y2
x2y2

=

√
2
2
0
0√
2
2
 , which implies ev((x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y))= 1.
Note that, x1y1 =
√
2
2 and x2y1 = 0 together imply that x2 = 0, which contradicts x2y2 =
√
2
2 . Similarly,
x2y2 =
√
2
2 and x1y2 = 0 together imply that x1 = 0, which contradicts x1y1 =
√
2
2 . Hence, as expected, the
above evaluation functional is non-classical. It amounts to assigning a value to the products xiy j but not to
the single components of x and y separately. Quoting [35, Supplement 3.4], “entangled states are holistic
entities in which the single components only exist virtually”.
(2) Existence of negative probabilities: Negative probabilities are not an intrinsic characteristic of QT. They
appear whenever one attempts to explain QT “classically” by looking at the space of charges on Ω. To see
this, consider ρe, and assume that, based on (17), one calculates:
∫ 
x1x
†
1y1y
†
1 x
†
1x2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
1y
†
1y2 x
†
1x2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
1 x2x
†
2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
2y
†
1y2 x2x
†
2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
1y1y
†
2 x
†
1x2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
1y2y
†
2 x
†
1x2y2y
†
2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
2 x2x
†
2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
2y2y
†
2 x2x
†
2y2y
†
2
dµ(x,y) = 12

1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
 . (17)
Because of Theorem 1, there is no probability charge µ satisfying these moment constraints, the only
compatible being signed ones. Box 1 reports the nine components and corresponding weights of one of
them:
µ(x,y) =
9
∑
i=1
wiδ{(x(i),y(i))}(x,y) with (wi,x
(i),y(i)) as in Box 1. (18)
Note that some of the weights are negative but ∑9i=1 wi = 1, meaning that we have an affine combination
of atomic charges (Dirac’s deltas).
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Box 1: charge compatible with (17)
1 2 3 4 5
x -0.0963 - 0.6352ι 0.251 - 0.9665ι 0.7884 + 0.2274ι 0.5702 - 0.4006ι 0.3452 - 0.4539ι-0.0065 - 0.7663ι 0.0387 + 0.0381ι -0.1263 + 0.5574ι 0.0027 + 0.7172ι 0.4872 + 0.6613ι
y -0.3727 - 0.3899ι 0.6359 - 0.5716ι 0.1553 - 0.4591ι -0.3515 + 0.2848ι 0.2129 - 0.2004ι-0.4385 - 0.7189ι 0.3725 + 0.3608ι 0.4039 + 0.7759ι 0.5911 - 0.6678ι 0.2032 - 0.9345ι
w 0.4805 0.7459 -0.892 0.7421 0.4724
6 7 8 9
x 0.818 + 0.2654ι -0.0541 - 0.8574ι -0.3179 - 0.1021ι -0.1255 - 0.3078ι-0.486 + 0.1556ι 0.4995 + 0.1112ι 0.5198 + 0.7864ι 0.2943 - 0.8961ι
y 0.446 + 0.6996ι -0.1628 + 0.561ι 0.6285 - 0.4852ι 0.0933 - 0.4588ι-0.5474 - 0.1096ι -0.8105 + 0.0419ι -0.0035 - 0.6079ι 0.8455 + 0.2568ι
w 0.3297 -0.7999 -0.2544 0.1755
The table reports the components of a charge ∑9i=1 wiδ{(x(i),y(i))}(x,y) that satisfies (17). The i-th column of the row denoted
as x (resp. y) corresponds to the element x(i) (resp. y(i)). The i-th column of the vector w corresponds to wi. Consider for
instance the first monomial x1x
†
1y1y
†
1 in (17), its expectation w.r.t. the above charge is∫
x1x
†
1y1y
†
1
(
9
∑
i=1
wiδ{(x(i),y(i))}(x,y)
)
dxdy =
9
∑
i=1
wix
(i)
1 x
(i)
1
†
y(i)1 y
(i)
1
†
= 0.4805(−0.0963−0.6352ι)(−0.0963+0.6352ι)(−0.3727−0.3899ι)(−0.3727+0.3899ι)
+0.7459(0.251−0.9665ι)(0.251+0.9665ι)(−0.1628+0.561ι)(−0.1628−0.561ι)
+ . . .
+0.1755(−0.1255−0.3078ι)(−0.1255+0.3078ι)(0.0933−0.4588ι)(0.0933+0.4588ι) = 1
2
.
The charge described in Box 1 is one among the many that satisfy (17) and has been derived numerically.
Explicit procedure for constructing such negative-probability representations have been developed in [62–
65].
Again, we want to stress that the two above paradoxical interpretations are a consequence of Theorem 1, and
therefore can emerge when considering any instance of a theory of P-coherence in which the hypotheses of this
result hold.
4.1 Local realism
The issue of local realism in QT arises when one performs measurements on a pair of separated but entangled
particles. This again shows the impossibility of a peaceful agreement between the internal logical consistency
of a P-coherent theory and the attempt to provide an external coherent (classical) interpretation. Let us discuss it
from the latter perspective. Firstly, notice that, since (x1x
†
1+ x2x
†
2) = 1, the linear operator
L


x1x
†
1y1y
†
1 x
†
1x2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
1y
†
1y2 x
†
1x2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
1 x2x
†
2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
2y
†
1y2 x2x
†
2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
1y1y
†
2 x
†
1x2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
1y2y
†
2 x
†
1x2y2y
†
2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
2 x2x
†
2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
2y2y
†
2 x2x
†
2y2y
†
2

 (19)
satisfies the properties:
L(x1x
†
1y1y
†
1)+L(x2x
†
2y1y
†
1) = L((x1x
†
1+ x2x
†
2)y1y
†
1) = L(y1y
†
1),
L(x1x
†
1y2y
†
2)+L(x2x
†
2y2y
†
2) = L((x1x
†
1+ x2x
†
2)y2y
†
2) = L(y2y
†
2),
L(x1x
†
1y1y
†
2)+L(x2x
†
2y1y
†
2) = L((x1x
†
1+ x2x
†
2)y1y
†
2) = L(y1y
†
2). (20)
Hence, by summing up some of the components of the matrix (19), we can recover the marginal linear operator
My = L
([
y1y
†
1 y1y
†
2
y2y
†
1 y2y
†
2
])
=
[1
2 0
0 12
]
,
where the last equality holds when L((x⊗ y)(x⊗ y)†) = ρe, i.e., My = 12 I2 is the reduced density matrix of ρe on
system B. The operation we have just described, when applied to a density matrix, is known in QT as partial
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trace. Given the interpretation of ρ as a dual operator, the operation of partial trace simply follows by Equation
(20).
Similarly, we can obtain
Mx = L
([
x1x
†
1 x1x
†
2
x2x
†
1 x2x
†
2
])
=
[1
2 0
0 12
]
.
Matrix Mx (analogously to My) is compatible with probability: there are marginal probabilities whose Mx is the
moment matrix, an example being
1
2
δ
1
0

(x)+
1
2
δ
0
1

(x).
In other words, we are brought to believe that marginally the physical properties x,y of the two particles have
a meaning, i.e., they can be explained through probabilistic mixtures of classical evaluation functionals. We
can now ask Nature, by means of a real experiment, to decide between our common-sense notions of how the
world works, and Alice’s one. Experimental verification of this phenomenon can be obtained by a CHSH-like
experiment, which aims at experimentally reproducing a situation where (14) holds, as explained in Box 2. In
this interpretation, the CHSH experiment is an entanglement witness, we discuss the connection between (14)
and the entanglement witness theorem in Section 4.2.
Box 2: CHSH experiment
 two-channel polarizers
source
detectors detectors
α
j
β
j
The source produces pairs of entangled photons, sent in opposite directions. Each photon encounters a two-channel polariser
whose orientations can be set by the experimenter. Emerging signals from each channel are captured by detectors. Four possible
orientations αi,β j for i, j = 1,2 of the polarisers are tested. Consider the Hermitian matrices Gαi = sin(αi)σx + cos(αi)σz, Gβ j =
sin
(
β j
)
σx + cos
(
β j
)
σz, where σx,σz are the 2D Pauli’s matrices, and define the gamble
(x†Gαi x)(y
†Gβ j y) = (x⊗ y)†Gαiβ j (x⊗ y)
on the result of experiment with Gαiβ j = Gαi ⊗Gβ j . Consider then the sum gamble
h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†(Gα1β2 −Gα1β2 +Gα2β1 +Gα2β2)(x⊗ y)
and observe that
h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†(Gα1 ⊗ (Gβ2 −Gβ2))(x⊗ y)+(x⊗ y)†(Gα2 ⊗ (Gβ1 +Gβ2))(x⊗ y)
= (x†Gα2 x)(y
†(Gβ1 +Gβ2)y)
≤ y†(Gβ1 +Gβ2)y
≤ 2,
this is the CHSH inequality. For a small ε > 0, we have that
h(x,y)−2− ε = (x⊗ y)†(−(2+ ε)I4 +Gα1β2 −Gα1β2 +Gα2β1 +Gα2β2)(x⊗ y)< 0
but
Tr((−(2+ ε)I4 +Gα1β2 −Gα1β2 +Gα2β1 +Gα2β2)ρe) =−2+ ε+2
√
2≥ 0
for α1 = pi/2,α2 = 0,β1 = pi/4,β2 = −pi/4. We are again in a situation like (14). The experiment in the figure certifies the
entanglement by measuring the QT expectation of the four components of h(x,y).
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The situation we have just described is the playground of Bell’s theorem, stating the impossibility of Ein-
stein’s postulate of local realism.
The argument goes as follows. If we assume that the physical properties x,y of the two particles (the po-
larisations of the photons) have definite values x˜, y˜ that exist independently of observation (realism), then the
measurement on the first qubit must influence the result of the measurement on the second qubit. Vice versa if
we assume locality, then x,y cannot exist independently of the observations. To sum up, a local hidden variable
theory that is compatible with QT results cannot exist [66].
But is there really anything contradictory here? The message we want to convey is that this is not the case.
Indeed, since Theorem 1 applies, there is no probability compatible with the moment matrix ρe. Ergo, although
they may seem to be compatible with probabilities, the marginal matrices Mx,My are not moment matrices of
any probability.
The conceptual mistake in the situation we are considering is to forget that Mx,My come from ρe. A joint
linear operator uniquely defines its marginals but not the other way round. There are infinitely many joint
probability charges whose Mx,My are the marginals, e.g.,
dµ(x,y) =
12δ
1
0

(x)+
1
2
δ
0
1

(x)

12δ
1
0

(y)+
1
2
δ
0
1

(y)
 ,
but none of them satisfy Equation (17). In fact, such an intrinsic non-uniqueness of the compatible joints is
another amazing characteristic of QT: from this perspective, it is not only a theory of probability, but a theory of
imprecise probability, see Section 3.1.
Instead, the reader can verify that the charge in Equation (18) satisfies both Equation (17) and:∫ [
x1x
†
1 x1x
†
2
x2x
†
1 x2x
†
2
]
dµ(x,y) =
∫ [
y1y
†
1 y1y
†
2
y2y
†
1 y2y
†
2
]
dµ(x,y) =
[1
2 0
0 12
]
.
The take-away message of this subsection is that we should only interpret Mx,My as marginal operators and
keep in mind that QT is a logical theory of P-coherence. We see paradoxes when we try to force a physical
interpretation upon QT, whose nature is instead computational. In other words, if we accept that computation is
more primitive than our classical interpretation of physics, all paradoxes disappear.
4.2 Entanglement witness theorem
In the previous Subsections, we have seen that all paradoxes of QT emerge because of disagreement between its
internal coherence and the attempt to force on it a classical coherent interpretation.
Do quantum and classical probability sometimes agree? Yes they do, but when at play there are density
matrices ρ such that Equation (14) does not hold, and thus in particular for separable density matrices. We make
this claim precise by providing a link between Equation (14) and the entanglement witness theorem [67, 68].
We first report the definition of entanglement witness [69, Sec. 6.3.1]:
Definition 3 (Entanglement witness). A Hermitian operator W ∈H n1×n2 is an entanglement witness if and only
if W is not a positive operator but (x1⊗ x2)†W (x1⊗ x2)≥ 0 for all vectors (x1,x2) ∈Ω1×Ω2.6
The next well-known result (see, e.g., [69, Theorem 6.39, Corollary 6.40]) provides a characterisation of
entanglement and separable states in terms of entanglement witness.
Proposition 2. A state ρe is entangled if and only if there exists an entanglement witness W such that Tr(ρeW )<
0. A state is separable if and only if Tr(ρeW )≥ 0 for all entanglement witnesses W.
Assume that W is an entanglement witness for the entangled density matrix ρe and consider W ′ = −W . By
Definition 3 and Proposition 2, it follows that
Tr(ρeW ′)> 0 and (x1⊗ x2)†W ′(x1⊗ x2)≤ 0. (21)
6In [69, Sec. 6.3.1], the last part of this definition says “for all factorized vectors x1⊗ x2”. This is equivalent to considering the pair
(x1,x2).
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The first inequality states that the gamble (x1⊗ x2)†W ′(x1⊗ x2) is strictly desirable for Alice (in theory T?)
given her belief ρe. Since the set of desirable gambles (B1) associated to ρe is closed, there exists ε > 0 such
that W ′′ =W ′− εI is still desirable, i.e, Tr(ρeW ′′)≥ 0 and
(x1⊗ x2)†W ′′(x1⊗ x2) = (x1⊗ x2)†W ′(x1⊗ x2)− ε < 0,
where we have exploited that (x1⊗ x2)†εI(x1⊗ x2) = ε . Therefore, (21) is equivalent to
Tr(ρeW ′′)≥ 0 and (x1⊗ x2)†W ′′(x1⊗ x2)< 0, (22)
which is the same as (14).
Hence, by Theorem 1, we can equivalently formulate the entanglement witness theorem as an arbitrage/Dutch
book:
Theorem 2. Let C= {g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) | Tr(Gρ˜)≥ 0} be the set of desirable gambles cor-
responding to some density matrix ρ˜ . The following claims are equivalent:
1. ρ˜ is entangled;
2. posi(C∪L ≥) is not coherent in T.
This result provides another view of the entanglement witness theorem in light of P-coherence. In particular,
it tells us that the existence of a witness satisfying Equation (21) boils down to the disagreement between the
classical probabilistic interpretation and the theory T? on the rationality (coherence) of Alice, and therefore that
whenever they agree on her rationality it means that ρe is separable.
This connection explains why the problem of characterising entanglement is hard in QT: it amounts to prov-
ing the negativity of a function, which is NP-hard.
5 Entangled states do not only exist in QT
In this Section we are going to present an example of entanglement in a P-coherence theory of probability that
is different from QT.
Consider two real variables x= [x1,x2]T with xi ∈R, the possibility spaceΩ= {x∈R2} and the vector space
of gambles
LR = {vT (x)Gv(x) : G is a symmetric real matrix},
where v(x) is the column vector of monomials:
v(x) = [1,x1,x2,x21,x1x2,x
2
2,x
3
1,x
2
1x2,x1x
2
2,x
3
2]
T ,
whose dimension is d = 10. LR is therefore the space of all polynomials of degree 6 of the real variables x1,x2.
It can be observed that inLR the constant functions can be represented as
vT (x)Gv(x) = vT (x)(ce1eT1 )v(x) = c,
for any constant c ∈ R, e1 being the first element of the canonical basis of Rd , i.e., e1 = [1,0, . . . ,0]. Compare
this with the non-negative constant functions in QT that have the form g(x1, . . . ,xm) = c(⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j), see
Section 3.
We say that C is a P-coherent set of desirable gambles whenever it satisfies (B0)–(B2) in Section 2.1 with
Σ≥ = {g(x1,x2) = vT (x)Gv(x) : G≥ 0}, (23)
Σ< = {g(x1,x2) = vT (x)Gv(x) : G < 0}. (24)
The polynomial vT (x)Gv(x) with G≥ 0 are called sum-of-square polynomials, see also Section 6.4.
In this case too we can define the dual operator
Z := L
(
v(x)vT (x)
)
. (25)
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If we define zαβ = L(xα1 x
β
2 ) ∈ R, then Z has the following structure
Z =

z00 z10 z01 z20 z11 z02 z30 z21 z12 z03
z10 z20 z11 z30 z21 z12 z40 z31 z22 z13
z01 z11 z02 z21 z12 z03 z31 z22 z13 z04
z20 z30 z21 z40 z31 z22 z50 z41 z32 z23
z11 z21 z12 z31 z22 z13 z41 z32 z23 z14
z02 z12 z03 z22 z13 z04 z32 z23 z14 z05
z30 z40 z31 z50 z41 z32 z60 z51 z42 z33
z21 z31 z22 z41 z32 z23 z51 z42 z33 z24
z12 z22 z13 z32 z23 z14 z42 z33 z24 z15
z03 z13 z04 z23 z14 z05 z33 z24 z15 z06
 (26)
where, for instance, z00 = L(1), z10 = L(x1), z20 = L(x21), z01 = L(x2), z02 = L(x
2
2) etc..
Now, the dual of C can be calculated as in Section 2.1:
Q=
{
z ∈ Rd : L(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0, Z ≥ 0, z00 = 1, ∀g ∈ C
}
. (27)
Note that, because the way constants are represented in this context, we have z00 = 1 instead of Tr(Z) = 1.
Since sum-of-squares (SOS) implies nonnegativity, a natural question is to known whether any nonnegative
polynomial of degree 6 of the real variables x1,x2 can be expressed as a sum of squares. It turns out that this is not
the case. Indeed, David Hilbert showed that equality between the set of nonnegative polynomials of n variables
of degree 2d and SOS polynomials of n variables of degree 2d holds only in the following three cases: univariate
polynomials (i.e., n = 1); quadratic polynomials (2d = 2); bivariate quartics (n = 2, 2d = 4). For all other cases,
there always exist nonnegative polynomials that are not sums of squares. The most famous counter-example is a
polynomial due to Motzkin:
m(x) = x41x
2
2+ x
2
1x
4
2− x21x22+1.
Motzkin polynomial is nonnegative but it is not a sum-of-squares. In what follow, it will be used to prove
that a theory T∗ in the space of polynomials of two real variables of degree 6 has “entangled density matrices”
in its dual space.
Consider the following PSD matrix [70] of type (26)
Ze =

1 0 0 353 0 353 0 0 0 0
0 353 0 0 0 0 249572 0 66 0
0 0 353 0 0 0 0 66 0 249572
353 0 0 249572 0 66 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0
353 0 0 66 0 249572 0 0 0 0
0 249572 0 0 0 0 706955894 0 17 0
0 0 66 0 0 0 0 17 0 17
0 66 0 0 0 0 17 0 17 0
0 0 249572 0 0 0 0 17 0 706955894
 (28)
and the negative polynomial −m(x). Since L( f ) = −1− z42− z24 + z22 and z22 = 66,z24 = z42 = 17 in (28),
we have that L( f ) = 31 > 0. Therefore, the conditions in (14) are met and Theorem 1 holds. In particular, this
means that the polynomial −m(x) is desirable by a subject, Alice, whose beliefs are expressed by Ze and who is
therefore a rational agent in T∗. However, the polynomial is negative: Alice is irrational in T.
Notice that, if we consider the definition of entanglement in Section 4.2, Ze is an entanglement matrix, since
−m(x)< 0 but L(−m(x))> 0.
Moreover, from (28) and the definition of Z we can extract the marginal operator for the variables x1,x2.
Mx1 = L
 1 x1 x21 x31x1 x21 x31 x41
x21 x
3
1 x
4
1 x
5
1
x31 x
4
1 x
5
1 x
6
1
= [ 1 0 353 00 353 0 249572353 0 249572 0
0 249572 0 706955894
]
, (29)
Mx2 = L
 1 x2 x22 x32x2 x22 x32 x42
x22 x
3
2 x
4
2 x
5
2
x32 x
4
2 x
5
2 x
6
2
= [ 1 0 353 00 353 0 249572353 0 249572
0
0 249572 0 706955894
]
. (30)
This time the operation is not equal to partial trace because, again, the structure of the polynomials vT (x)Gv(x)
is different from those in QT.
Since Mx1 ,Mx2 are both PSD they are valid moment matrices. Moreover, for single real variables, Hilbert
has shown that every nonnegative polynomial is SOS and, therefore, marginally, the above truncated moment
matrices are compatible with classical probability. A subject whose marginal beliefs are expressed by Mx1 ≥
0,Mx2 ≥ 0 is always rational in T. This is exactly the same situation encountered when showing the impossibility
of a local realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Section 4.1): the marginals seem compatible with
classical probability but the joint is not, since we can derive a Bell-type inequalities that are violated by Ze.
Again the conceptual mistake of this reading is to forget that Mx and My come from Ze and thus they should
only be interpreted as marginal operators .
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6 Discussions
6.1 The class of P-nonnegative gambles
The class of P-nonnegative gambles, defined in Section 3, is the closed convex cone of all Hermitian sum-of-
squares in LR = {(⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) | G ∈H r×r}, that is of all gambles g(x1, . . . ,xm) ∈LR for which G is
PSD. In particular this means that Alice can efficiently determine whether a gamble is P-nonnegative or not.
But is this class the only closed convex cone of nonnegative polynomials in LR for which the membership
problem can be solved efficiently (in polynomial-time)? It turns out that the answer is negative (see for instance
[71, 72]): in addition of Hermitian sum-of-squares (the one that Nature has chosen for QT) one could also
consider real sum-of-squares inLR, that is polynomials of the form (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) that are sum-of-squares
of polynomials of the real and imaginary part of the variables x j.
A separating example is the polynomial in (15), which is not a Hermitian sum-of-squares but it is a real sum-
of-square, as it can be seen from (16). This polynomial was used in our example because it can be constructed
by inspection and its nonnegativity follows immediately by (16). Clearly, there exist nonnegative polynomials
inLR that are neither Hermitian sum-of-squares nor real sum-of-squares.
Why has Nature chosen Hermitian sum-of-squares? This is an open question that we will investigate in
future work. A possible explanation may reside in the different size of the corresponding optimisation problems
[72]. Another possible explanation is that the class of Hermitian sum-of-squares is always strictly included in
the class of real sum-of-squares polynomials. Therefore, the former may be the smallest class of gambles that
allows one to efficiently determine whether a gamble is P-nonnegative, but that is still expressive enough [47,
Proposition 6].
6.2 A hidden variable model for a single quantum system
In [73], Kochen and Specker gave a hidden variable model agreeing with the Born’s rule but not preserving
the structure of functional dependencies in QT. Their idea amounts to introducing a “hidden variable” for each
observable H producing stochasticity in outcomes of measurement of H. The totality of all such hidden variables
is then the phase space variable ω of the model.
It turns out that, for a single quantum system, our model based on the phase space
Ω= {x ∈ Cn : x†x = 1},
is also a hidden variable model. The reason being that, for a single quantum system, Σ≥ =L ≥R and Σ
< =L <R ,
and therefore Alice will never accepts negative gambles. Notice that in this case, the matrix ρ = L(xx†) can be
interpreted as a moment matrix as discussed in Section 3.1.
This hidden-variable model for QT is also discussed by Holevo in [35, Sec. 1.7], where the author notices that
such model does not fulfil the key requirement imposed in many existing “no-go” theorems stating that a state is
uniquely represented. To appreciate this point, remember that in Section 3.1 we noticed that a truncated moment
matrix does not define a unique probability. Based on this nonuniqueness property, we have thence shown that
QT is compatible with CPT in the case of a n-level single particle system. Now, notice that a hidden variable
theory would necessarily treat as distinct two probabilities that define the same density matrix. However, since
they are underdetermined by the observations, these two probabilities are unidentifiable models. In fact, since any
real-valued observable is described by a Hermitian operator and the expectation of a Hermitian operator w.r.t.
a given density matrix (truncated moment matrix) is unique (Tr(Gρ)), the density matrix (truncated moment
matrix) is sufficient to provide an adequate characterisation of these two probabilities. Therefore, if we accept
that a hidden-variable model does not require a one-to-one correspondence (because of unidentifiability), a
hidden-variable model may be defined as an equivalence class (the set of all probabilities associated to a given
truncated moment matrix). This nonuniqueness argument is also discussed in [74] and [35, Supplementary 3.2].
Finally, we notice that our hidden variable model differs from Holevo’s one when we consider m > 1 parti-
cles. This is the topic of the next Section.
6.3 On the use of tensor product
In Section 3 we saw that the possibility space of composite systems of m particles, each one with n j degrees
of freedom, is given by Ω = ∏mj=1C
n j , and that gambles (real-valued observable) on such space are actually
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bounded real functions g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j), where ⊗ denotes the tensor product between vec-
tors, seen as column matrices.
In what follows, we justify the use of tensor product, and more specifically the type of gambles on the
possibility space of composite systems, as a consequence of the way a multivariate theory of probability is
usually formulated.
As a start, let us consider the case of classical probability. In CPT, structural judgements of indepen-
dence/dependence between random variables are expressed through product between random variables: given
factorised gambles g(x1, . . . ,xm)=∏mj=1 g j(x j), the variables x1, . . . ,xm are said to be independent if E[∏
m
j=1 g j(x j)]=
∏mj=1 E[g j(x j)] for all g j, where E[·] denote the expectation operator. With this in mind, let us go back to our
setting. Marginal gambles are of type g j(x j) = x
†
jG jx j. This means that structural judgements are performed by
considering factorised gambles of the form ∏mj=1 x
†
jG jx j. It is thence not difficult to verify that
m
∏
j=1
x†jG jx j = (⊗mj=1x j)†(⊗mj=1G j)(⊗mj=1x j).
By closing the set of factorised gambles under the operations of addition and scalar (real number) multipli-
cation, one finally gets a vector space whose domain domain coincides with the collection of all gambles of
the form (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j). Hence, structural judgements of independence/dependence are stated by Alice
considering the desirability of gambles belonging toLR.
In QT, there is a confusion over the role of the tensor product, used to define the state space, that can actually
be elucidated by looking at Theorem 1. In order to see this, let us consider two quantum systems A and B, with
corresponding Hilbert spacesHA andHB. By duality, the density matrix (state) of the joint system lives in the
tensor product spaceHA⊗HB. Indeed, we have that
L((⊗2j=1x j)†G(⊗2j=1x j)) = L(Tr(G(⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†))
= Tr(G L((⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†)),
and L((⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†) belongs to HA ⊗HB. However, when (14) holds, we may justify entanglement
hypothesising the existence of non classical evaluation functions or, equivalently, a larger possibility space (The-
orem 1). This is clearly discussed in [35, Supplement 3.4]:
Since the set of pure states of the composite system Ω is larger than Cartesian product ΩA×ΩB,
the phase space of the classical description of the composite system will be larger than the product
of phase spaces for the components: ΩA×ΩB  Ω. Therefore this classical description is not a
correspondence between the categories of classical and quantum system preserving the operation of
forming the composite systems. Moreover, it appears that there is no way to establish such a corre-
spondence. In any classical description of a composite quantum system the variables corresponding
to observables of the components are necessarily entangled in the way unusual for classical subsys-
tems.
To sum up, we argue that ΩA×ΩB  Ω is a manifestation of computational rationality.
6.4 Sum-of-squares optimisation
The theory of moments (and its dual theory of positive polynomials) are used to develop efficient numerical
schemes for polynomial optimization, i.e., global optimization problems with polynomial function. Such prob-
lems arise in the analysis and control of nonlinear dynamical systems, and also in other areas such as combinato-
rial optimization. This scheme consists of a hierarchy of semidefinite programs (SDP) of increasing size which
define tighter and tighter relaxations of the original problem. Under some assumptions, it can be showed that
the associated sequence of optimal values converges to the global minimum, see for instance [75, 76]. Note that,
every polynomial in
Σ≥ := {g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) : G≥ 0},
is (Hermitian) sum-of-squares because it can be rewritten as:
(⊗mj=1x j)†HH†(⊗mj=1x j) =
k
∑
i=1
|(H†(⊗mj=1x j))i|2,
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with G = HH†.
We have recently discussed the connection between SOS optimisation (for polynomials of real variables)
and computational rationality (also called bounded rationality) in [77].
In QT, SDP has been used to numerically prove that a certain state is entangled [78–86]. The work [79, 80]
realized that the set of separable quantum states can be approximated by sum-of-squares hierarchies. This leads
to the SDP hierarchy of Doherty-Parrilo-Spedalieri, which is extensively employed in quantum information.
The present, purely foundational, work differs from these approaches by stating that the Universe (micro-
scopic world) is nothing but a big “device” that solves SOS optimisation problems. In fact, as discussed in
Section 7, the postulate of computational efficiency embodied by B0 (through the above definition of Σ≥, i.e.,
the cone of Hermitian sum-of-squares polynomials) may indeed be the fundamental law in QT. This totally dif-
ferent perspective may have a relevant impact in quantum computing, such as the development of new algorithms
for quantum computing that exploit the connection between QT and SDP highlighted in this paper.
6.5 Comparisons
Before comparing our approach with attempts to reconstruct QT, we make the following general remark.
Although being model-based, and thus assuming a model of the input space, what is really only used by
our approach are the minimal assumptions—linearity, tautology (non-negative gambles) and falsum (negative
gambles)—needed to capture the common structural properties of all rational choice theories [46, 52, 53]: deci-
sion theory, game theory, social choice theory and market theory. Given those assumptions, it is then possible
to derive CPT and QT, that is the definition of probability or state and all the corresponding rules. On the con-
trary, in many of the approaches to quantum reconstruction, either the notion of probability or the notion of state
is already assumed. Our framework therefore provides in several respects a complementary path to quantum
reconstruction, which reveals the essence of the “quantum weirdness”: the computational postulate.
6.5.1 Our previous approach
Partially inspired by [36], in [44] we introduced a syntactically different framework from which we were able
to derive the postulates of QT. It is roughly defined as follows. Assume the space of outcomes of experiment on
a n-dimensional quantum systems is represented by the set Ω = {ω1, . . . ,ωn}, with ωi denoting the elementary
event “detection along i”. A gamble on an experiment is a Hermitian matrix G ∈H n×n. By accepting a gamble
G, Alice commits herself to receive γi ∈ R utiles if the outcome of the experiment eventually happens to be ωi,
where γi is defined from G and the projection-valued measurement Π∗ = {Π∗i }ni=1, representing the n orthogonal
directions of the quantum state, as follows:
Π∗i GΠ
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i for i = 1, . . . ,n. (31)
A subset H n×n is thus said to be coherent if it is a closed convex cone C containing the set {G ∈H n×n :
G  0} of all PSD matrices in H n×n and disjoint from the interior of {G ∈H n×n : G ≤ 0}. We then proved
that the dual of a coherent convex cone of matrix gambles C is a closed convex set of density matrices [44,
Prop.IV.3]:
Q=
{
ρ ∈H n×n : ρ ≥ 0,Tr(ρ) = 1,Tr(Gρ)≥ 0, ∀G ∈ C} . (32)
When C is a maximal7 cone, its dual Q := C • includes a single density matrix. This allowed us to show that
QT is a generalised theory of probability: its axiomatic foundation can be derived from a logical consistency
requirement in the way a subject accepts gambles on the results of a quantum experiment (similar to the ax-
iomatic foundation of classical probability). However, at the time of writing [44], it was not clear to us why the
probability is generalised in such a way in QT, what this could possibly mean, why does entanglement exist, etc.
That is, it was not clear to us that everything follows by the computation postulate B0.
Below, by providing a bijection between coherent convex cones of matrices and P-coherent systems of poly-
nomial gambles, we show the connection between [44] and the present work. In order to that, we first need to
replace [44, Definition III.1,(S3)], that is the openness property, with (S3’): if G+ εI ∈ C for all ε > 0 then G
is in C (closedness). Hence, the bijection f between C and C is obtained by first noticing the correspondence
7For a definition, see Definition 4 in the Appendix.
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between the duals in Section 3 and (32), and thus simply composing the duality maps from C to Q and from Q to
C :
Q
C=posi(G∪Σ≥)︷ ︸︸ ︷{ |G |
∑
i=1
λi(⊗mj=1x j)†Gi(⊗mj=1x j)+(⊗mj=1x j)†M(⊗mj=1x j) : λi ≥ 0,M ≥ 0
}
{ |G |
∑
i=1
λiGi +M : λi ≥ 0,M ≥ 0
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
f
Based on f and the results in [44], it is therefore almost8 immediate to derive from B0–B2 the remaining other
axioms and rules of QT (such as Lu¨der’s rule (measurement updating), Schro¨dinger’s rule (time evolution)), see
Appendix S.9.
6.5.2 QBism
The foundation of QT through desirability presented in this paper shares a goal similar to that of QBism, which
is to justify quantum mechanics by using coherence arguments [28–34].
QBism aims at rewriting QT in a way that does not involve the density operator ρ and use classical proba-
bilistic Bayesian arguments to prove coherence of QT. For instance, in [33] QBists have shown that it is possible
to rewrite Born’s rule in a way that does not include the density operator ρ anymore, so as to give it a classi-
cal (Bayesian) interpretation. Starting from a symmetric informationally complete (SIC) POVM [87, 88], they
rewrite the Born’s rule as:
p j =
n2
∑
i=1
(
(n+1)qi− 1n
)
r( j|i). (33)
Here, qi represent the probability of the outcomes of an experiment (a SIC measure with n2 outcomes), which
is only imagined and never performed. The terms r( j|i) are instead the probabilities of seeing the outcome j in
the actually performed experiment, given the outcome i in the imagined one. Finally, p j is the probability of the
outcomes in the actual experiment. Fuchs and Shack call (33) the “quantum law of total probability”, because
they interpret it as a modification of the standard law of total probability:
p j =
n2
∑
i=1
r( j|i)qi, (34)
which is well known to follow from coherence, i.e., Dutch-book arguments [89, 90]. Thus, according to Fuchs
and Shack, the rule (33) can be regarded as an addition to the standard Dutch-book coherence, a sort of “coher-
ence plus”, which defines the valid quantum states:
“It expresses a kind of empirically extended coherence—not implied by Dutch-book coherence
alone, but formally similar to the kind of relation one gets from Dutch-book coherence” [33].
Under this view, Equation (33) can be interpreted as a consistency requirement, i.e., a law that must hold to
produce a consistent quantum world. We regard it as portraying a partial view: in fact, the law (33) is not
total probability, and hence, strictly speaking, is incoherent according to de Finetti’s (classical) definition of
coherence. Note in fact that, (n+ 1)qi− 1n for i = 1, . . . ,n2 is not a probability distribution, since it is negative
for some i. Therefore, for QBism an important question is, can the rule (33) still be derived from a Dutch-book
argument? If not, what type of coherence does this rule represent?
By applying our formalism, we can answer such questions. Assume we are considering a single particle
system of dimension n and, therefore, the possibility space is Cn := {x ∈ Cn : x†x = 1}. Then, note that qi =
Tr(QiL(xx†)) and, we have shown in Section 3, that in the single particle case L(xx†) can always be interpreted
as a moment matrix (in the single particle case, a polynomial x†Gx is non-negative iff G≥ 0). Thus, (n+1)qi− 1n
8We need to take into account that (S3) has been replaced by (S3’).
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is an expectation and, therefore, is coherent in de Finetti’s sense! According to our interpretation, we should not
compare (33) and (34). They cannot be compared, because the first is an expectation (of a quadratic form), while
the second is the law of total probability.
In multiple-particle systems, the coherence of (33) follows by B0–B2. Hence, in this case, the “modified
coherence” implied by the rule (33) is expressed by the computation postulate.
6.5.3 Operational approach and information-theoretic reconstructions
The operational framework starts with a description of a typical laboratory situation where there is a preparation
procedure, followed by some transformation procedures and finally a measurement. The first approach to derive
QT within the operational framework is due to Lucien Hardy [8]. Hardy starts with a set of unnormalized
probabilities (States) describing the preparation procedure, a set of measurements, and a set of transformations,
and then imposes five “physically reasonable” postulates on top of that framework. He thence shows that QT is
the unique theory in the framework that satisfies these postulates.
This way of proceeding is common to all reconstructions based on the operational approach: the main dif-
ferences are to be found in the choice of postulates, being either physically reasonable or based on information-
theoretic principles.
The initial set of states are in general unnormalized probabilities. This definition is so generic that there
are no constraints [91] other than the stipulation that it ought to describe the probability of the measurement
outcomes. As clarified in [9, Assumption 7], the initial definition of allowed states (and transformations) is
(sometimes only implicitly) an axiom in the operational approach to quantum reconstructions. Thus, one can
think about the operational approaches [9] as first defining a generalized probabilistic theory and then defining
postulates to derive either CPT or QT (or other theories like Generalized Non-Signalling Theory or Generalized
Local Theory).
It is worth to point out the following [91]:
[These] reconstructions do not provide explanatory power in an even stronger sense: they do not
typically tell us what quantum states are, or what is really going on in the world when we perform a
Bell experiment, for example.
The approach we followed considers an explanatory model as starting, not from the outcomes of the experi-
ment but, from (hidden) variables describing the phenomenon of interest (e.g., the “directions” of the particle’s
spins), their domains (possibility space) and the functions of the variables we can observe (observables) and are
interested in (queries).
Given this view, we have thence shown that QT is an instance of a theory satisfying both the coherence and
computation postulates. In doing so, we shed light on both what are quantum states and on the nature of Bell-
like inequalities and entanglement. Moreover, we clarify why there are cases where QT is in agreement with
CPT—that is precisely when inferences in CPT can be computed in polynomial time—, and cases where QT
cannot be reconciled with CPT—that is precisely when inferences in CPT cannot be computed in polynomial
time.
We want to point out again that one of the differences between our approach and the operational recon-
struction, is the choice of the possibility space. In the operational reconstruction, CPT is defined over a finite
possibility space Ω˜ (the finite outcomes of a POVM measurement). Therefore, the set of all probabilities on Ω˜
is the simplex of probability of dimension |Ω˜|−1. The simplex has finite extremes. To rule out CPT and single
out QT, one (or more than one) axiom (for instance Hardy’s axiom 5) is introduced to imply that the convex set
of states must have infinitely many extremes. In this paper, we instead follow a different route. The possibility
space Ω we consider is infinite and, in such a space, CPT has also infinite extremes: these extremes are atomic
probability charges on the elements of the possibility space Ω. Therefore, from the perspective adopted in this
work, the difference between CPT and QT is not in the finite versus infinite number of extremes (they both have
infinite extremes). Instead, we have shown that the classical-quantum divide originates from the computational
postulate.
We have also made precise the term “generalised probability theory”. Generalised probability theories have
a long tradition outside (quantum) physics: they have been developed to model robustness (robust Bayesian
model), to model the different facets of uncertainty, to model incomplete preferences in market and game-theory,
to model conditioning with zero probability events etc..
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Probability theory is at the foundation of rational decision theory, but most importantly the laws of probability
can be derived from rational requirements in the way an agent make decisions. One of the major perils in
generalisations of probability theory is to build theories that are so generic that there are no constraints. In these
cases, reasoning with the theory can lead to logical contradictions. Avoiding that should be the premise of any
generalised operational probabilistic theory.
To prevent that, a generalisation of probability must begin with a notion of logical consistency (coherence
or, in other words, a definition of rational choice). In this paper, we have shown that the one that Nature uses in
QT follows by the coherence and computation postulate.
7 Conclusions
Since its foundation, there have been two main ways to explain the differences between QT and classical proba-
bility. The first one, that goes back to Birkhoff and von Neumann [1], explains this differences with the premise
that, in QT, the Boolean algebra of events is taken over by the “quantum logic” of projection operators on a
Hilbert space. The second one is based on the view that the quantum-classical clash is due to the appearance of
negative probabilities [2, 3].
Recently, there has been a research effort, the so-called “quantum reconstruction”, which amounts to trying
to rebuild the theory from more primitive postulates.
A common trait of all these approaches is that of regarding QT as a generalised theory of probability. But
why is probability generalised in such a way, and what are quantum states? Why sometimes is QT compatible
with classical probability theory? We have shown that the answer to this question rests in the computational
intractability of classical probability theory contrasted to the polynomial-time complexity of QT.
Note that there have been previous investigations into the computational nature of QT but they have mostly
focused on topics of undecidability (these results are usually obtained via a limiting argument, as the number
of particles goes to infinity, see, e.g., [92]; this does not apply to our setting as we rather take the stance that
the Universe is a finite physical system) and of potential computational advantages of non-standard theories
involving modifications of quantum theory [93–96].
The key postulate that separates classical probability and QT is B0: the computation postulate. Because
of B0, Theorem 1 applies and thus the “weirdness” of QT follows: negative probabilities, existence of non-
classical evaluation functionals and, therefore, irreconcilability with the classical probabilistic view. The formu-
lation of Theorem 1 points to the fact that there are three possible ways out to provide a theoretical foundation
of QT: (1) redefining the notion of evaluation functionals (algebra of the events), which is the approach adopted
within the Quantum Logic [4, Axiom VII]; (2) the algebra of the events is classical but probabilities are replaced
by quasi-probabilities (allowing negative values), see for instance [62, 97]; (3) the quantum-classical contrast has
a purely computational character. The last approach starts by accepting P6=NP to justify the separation between
the microscopic quantum system and the macroscopic world. We quote Aaronson [98]:
... while experiment will always be the last appeal, the presumed intractability of NP-complete
problems might be taken as a useful constraint in the search for new physical theories.
The postulate of computational efficiency embodied by B0 (through (9)) may indeed be the fundamental law in
QT, similar to the second law of thermodynamics, or the impossibility of superluminal signalling.
As future work we aim to address the following question: can we make the choice of nonnegative gambles
(Hermitian sum-of-squares in QT) to follow from an additional postulate? This will turn our approach into
a full quantum reconstruction. In particular, we would like to investigate the possibility of characterising the
choice of nonnegative gambles via symmetry arguments (for instance by exploiting ideas from [43]). We also
plan to compare our approach with that of Goyal and Knuth [43]. Here the authors prove that CPT and QT
can be derived from the same principles, once the appropriate symmetries (that are operative in each domain)
are identified. In particular, we would like to verify if the the compatibility (incompatibility) between CPT and
QT we proved for single (respectively multiple) particle systems is also somehow present in their approach. We
finally aim to extend our approach to the case of indistinguishable particles.
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S Further results and derivations
We introduce the following notations and definitions that will be used in the rest of the Appendix. Recall that
posi denotes the conic hull operator, whereas by cl we denote the closure operator.
◦ 1 denotes the unitary gamble in L . We have introduced the symbol 1 to distinguish the unitary function
inL , i.e., 1(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈Ω, from the scalar (real number) 1.
◦ 1R denotes the unitary gamble inLR.
◦ N(G ) := clposi(L ≥∪G ).
◦ NR(G ) := clposi(L ≥R ∪G ).
◦ NB(G ) := clposi(Σ≥∪G ).
Definition 4. A coherent (equiv. P-coherent) set of desirable gambles K is said to be maximal when for every
g ∈L \K (respectively g ∈LR\K) −1 ∈ clposi(g∪K).
It means that, if K is maximal, we cannot enlarge it while preserving coherence (equiv. P-coherence).
S.1 The unitary constant plays the role of falsum
The following result, in addition to providing a necessary and sufficient condition for coherence, states that −1
can be regarded as playing the role of the Falsum and A2 can be reformulated as −1 /∈ K. It is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 3.8.5 and Claim 3.7.4 in [99].
Proposition 3. Let G be a set of gambles. The following claims are equivalent
1. N(G ) is coherent,
2. posi(G )∩L < = /0,
3. −1 /∈ posi(G ∪L ≥),
4. g /∈ N(G ), for some gamble g ∈L .
Postulate A2, which presupposes postulates A0 and A1, provides the normative definition of TDG, referred
to by T. Based on it, in Subsection S.3 we derive the axioms of classical, Bayesian, probability theory. This
is simply based on the fact that, geometrically, K is a closed convex cone. It is thence clear from the above
definition that L ≥ is the minimal coherent set of desirable gambles. It characterises a state of full ignorance
– a subject without knowledge about ω should only accept nonnegative gambles. Conversely, a coherent set
of desirable gambles is called maximal if there is no other coherent set of desirable gambles including it (see
Definition 4). In terms of rationality, a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles is a set of gambles that Alice
cannot extend by accepting other gambles while keeping at the same time rationality. It also represents a situation
in which Alice is sure about the state of the system.
S.2 Inference in T
In the operational interpretation of T, agents can buy/sell gambles from/to each other. Therefore, an agent must
be able to determine the selling/buying prices for gambles. This can be formulated as an inference procedure on
K. For simplicity, we consider finite sets of assessments, and denote by |A| the cardinality of a set A.
Definition 5. Let G be a finite set of assessments of desirability, and N(G ) be a coherent set of desirable gambles.
Given f ∈L , we denote with
E( f ) := sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
f (ω)− γ0−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi(ω)≥ 0 ∀ω ∈Ω,
(35)
the lower prevision of f . The upper prevision of f is equal to E( f ) =−E(− f ).
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The lower prevision of a gamble is Alice’s supremum buying price for f , i.e., how much she should pay to
buy the gamble f . The upper prevision is Alice’s infimum selling price for f , i.e., how much she should ask to
sell the gamble f . We will show in Appendix S.4 that the lower and upper prevision are just the lower and upper
expectation for the gamble f . By exploiting A1, we can equivalently rewrite (35) as:
E( f ) = sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
f − γ01−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈L ≥,
(36)
or equivalently,
E( f ) = sup
γ0∈R
γ0 s.t. f − γ01 ∈ N(G ). (37)
In other words, we have expressed the constraint in the above optimisation problems as a membership.
S.3 Probabilistic interpretation through duality
We aim to show that the dual of a coherent set of desirable gambles is a closed convex set of probability charges:
P =
{
µ ∈M≥ :
∫
1dµ = 1,
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀g ∈K
}
, (38)
whereM≥ is the set of nonnegative charges.
The key point in the duality proof is that L ≥ (the set of all nonegative gambles (real-valued bounded func-
tion) on Ω) includes indicator functions.9 This is crucial to prove that the dual of K is always included in
M≥. When this is not the case, the dual of a coherent set of desirable gambles is not anymore a convex set of
probabilities.
Note that, equipped with the supremum norm,L constitutes a Banach space, and its topological dualL ∗ is
the space of all bounded functionals on it. We assume the weak∗ topology onL ∗.
Let A be the algebra of subsets of Ω and µ :A → [−∞,∞] denotes a charge: that is µ is a finitely additive
set function of A [55, Ch.11], [100], that can take positive and negative values. We have that every gamble on
L is integrable with respect to any finite charge [55, Th.11.8]. Therefore, for any gamble g and finite charge µ
we can define
∫
gdµ , which we can interpret as a linear functional L(·) := 〈·,µ〉 on g. We denote byM the set
of all finite charges on L and by M≥ the set of nonnegative charges. M is isometrically isomorphic to L ∗.
The duality bracket betweenL andM is given by 〈 f ,µ〉 := ∫ f dµ , with f ∈L and µ ∈M .
A linear functional L of gambles is said to be nonnegative whenever it satisfies : L(g) ≥ 0, for g ∈ L ≥.
A nonnegative linear functional is called a state if moreover it preserves the unitary constant gamble. In our
context, this means L(1) = 〈1,µ〉 = ∫ 1dµ = 1, i.e., the linear functional is scale preserving. Hence, the set of
states S corresponds to the closed convex set of all probability charges.
We define the dual of a subset K ofL as:
K• =
{
µ ∈M :
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀g ∈K
}
. (39)
Similarly, the dual of a subsetR ofM is the set:
R• =
{
g ∈L :
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀µ ∈R
}
. (40)
Note that in both cases (·)• is always a closed convex cone [55, Lem.5.102(4)]. Furthermore, one has that
(·)•• = (·), whenever (·) is a closed convex cone [55, Th.5.103], and (·)1 ⊆ (·)2 if and only if (·)•2 ⊆ (·)•1 [55,
Lem.5.102(1)]. In particular, whenever (·)1 and (·)2 are closed convex cones, (·)1 ( (·)2 if and only if (·)•2 ( (·)•1.
Based on those facts, it is thus possible to verify that the dual of a coherent set of desirable gambles can
actually be completely described in terms of a (closed convex) set of states (probability charges). In this aim, we
start by the following observations.
9An indicator function defined on a subset A⊆Ω is a function that is equal to one for all elements in A and 0 for all elements outside
A.
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Proposition 4. It holds that
1. (L )• = {0} andL = ({0})•;
2. (L ≥)• =M≥ andL ≥ = (M≥)•;
Proof. Since (·)•• = (·), whenever (·) is a closed convex cone, in both cases it is enough to verify only one of
the claims. For the first item, the second claim is immediate. For the second item, we verify the first claim.
The inclusion from right to left being clear, for the other direction observe that: (i) g = I{B} (with IB being the
indicator function on B ∈A ), is a nonnegative gamble and, therefore, is in L ≥; (ii) if µ is negative in B ∈A ,
i.e., then
∫
IBdµ is negative too and, thus, µ cannot be in (L ≥)•.
Proposition 5. Let K be a closed convex cone. The following claims are equivalent
1. K is coherent;
2. K⊇L ≥ and K 6=L ;
3. (K)• ⊆M≥ and (K)• 6= {0}.
Proof. (2)⇔ (3): From Proposition 4, (K)• = {0} if and only if K =L , and K ⊇L ≥ if and only if (K)• ⊆
M≥.
(1)⇒ (2): Assume K is coherent. By A.1 K⊇L ≥ and by A.2 there is g ∈L such that supg < 0 and g /∈K.
(2)⇒ (1): Let L ≥ ⊆K (L . First of all, notice that, by Proposition 4, (K)• ⊆ (L ≥)• =M≥. Now, assume
that K is not coherent. This means A.2 fails, i.e. there is g ∈ L such that supg < 0 and g ∈ K. Hence,
consider µ ∈M≥ and pick g ∈K such that supg < 0. It holds that 〈g,µ〉 ≥ 0 if and only if µ = 0, meaning that
(K)• = {0} and therefore, by Proposition 4 again, K=L , a contradiction.
Finally, we can prove
Theorem 3. The map
K 7→P :=K•∩S
establishes a bijection between coherent sets of desirable gambles and non-empty closed convex sets of states.
Proof. We want to verify that the map
K 7→P :=K•∩S
establishes a bijection between coherent sets of desirable gambles and non-empty closed convex sets of states.
The proof is analogous to that by [101, Th.4]. LetK be a coherent set of desirable gambles. By Proposition 5, we
get thatK• is a closed convex cone included inM≥ that does not reduce to the origin. Thus, after normalisation,
P is nonempty. Preservation of closedness and convexity by finite intersections yields that P is closed and
convex. Furthermore R+P =K•, and thereforeK= (R+P)•, where R+P := {λµ : λ ≥ 0,µ ∈P}, meaning
that the map is an injection. We finally verify that the map is also a surjection. To do this, letP be a non empty
closed convex set of probability charges. It holds that R+P is a closed convex cone included in M≥ different
from {0}. Again by Proposition 5, we conclude that the dual (R+P)• of R+P is a coherent set of desirable
gambles andP = R+P ∩S= (R+P)••∩S.
This means that we can write the dual of K as the set
P =
{
µ ∈ S : Lµ(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈K
}
, (41)
which is a closed convex-set of probability charges. We have derived the axioms of probability: a non-negative
function that integrates to one.Moreover, it can be easily proven thatP is a singleton whenever K is a maximal
coherent set of desirable gambles. In other words, for maximal K, there is only one probability charge µ that is
compatible with the constraints Lµ(g)≥ 0.
As an immediate corollary of the previous results, we finally obtain Theorem 4. It provides us with a
characterisation of the dual of a closed convex cone which is not coherent.
Theorem 4. Let K be a non empty closed convex cone. Then the following are equivalent
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1. K 6=L and K is not coherent;
2. K• 6⊆M≥,
3. K•∩{µ ∈M | 〈1,µ〉= 1} 6⊆ S.
4. {0}(K• and K•∩S= /0.
Essentially, Theorem 4 is telling us that, from the dual point of view, non degenerated closed convex cones
of gambles that are not coherent are characterised by signed (non positive) charges.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4. Given a non empty closed convex coneK, we need to check that the following claims
are equivalent
1. K 6=L and K is not coherent;
2. (K)• 6⊆M≥,
3. K•∩{µ ∈M | 〈1,µ〉= 1} 6⊆ S.
4. {0}(K• and K•∩S= /0.
Notice that K• ⊇ {0}, and that, by Proposition 4, all claims imply K• 6= {0} and K 6= L . The equivalence
between (2) and (3) being obvious, the one between (1) and (2) is an immediate consequence of Proposition
5. For the equivalence between (1) and (4), first of all notice that, since K is a non empty closed convex cone,
{0} ⊆ K• if and only if K 6=L . Now, assume K is not coherent. This means there is a negative gamble g in
K. Hence, K•∩S= /0 since probability charges do not preserves negative gambles. Finally, if K is coherent, by
Theorem 3, K•∩S is a non-empty closed convex cone of probability charges.
S.4 Inference in CPT
As already mentioned, once we have defined the duality between TDG and probability theory, we can imme-
diately reformulate the lower and upper previsions by means of probabilities. Indeed, let G be a finite set of
assessments, and K := N(G ) be a coherent set of desirable gambles. Given f ∈ L , the lower prevision of f
defined in Equation (35) can also be computed as:
E( f ) := inf
µ∈S
∫
Ω
f (ω)dµ
s.t :∫
Ω
gi(ω)dµ ≥ 0,∀ gi ∈ G .
(42)
which is equivalent to
E( f ) := inf
µ∈P
∫
Ω
f (ω)dµ. (43)
The upper prevision of f is defined E( f ) =−E(− f ).
Hence, the lower and upper prevision of f w.r.t. K are just the lower and upper expectation of f w.r.t.P . In
case K is maximal, thenP includes only a single probability and, therefore, in this case:
E( f ) = E( f ) = E( f ),
i.e., the expectation of f . That is, the solution of (42) coincides with the expectation of f . We have considered
the more general case E( f )≤ E( f ) because, as we have discussed in Section 3.1, QT is a theory of “imprecise”
probability [50].10
10The term “imprecise” refers to the fact that the closed convex set P may not be a singleton, that is the probability may not be
“precisely” specified. Imprecise probability theory is also referred as robust Bayesian.
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S.5 Relative coherence
Why do we need T if it is dual to classical probability theory? The point is that, T, having the structure of an
abstract logic, is independent of the specific contingent properties of the underlying space of gambles. From
this perspective, it is thence more general than probability theory and can be used to model any circumstance in
which an agent has to make a rational choice.
For instance, we can define the desirability postulates on any vector subspace of L that includes constant
gambles. This is useful in applications where the gambles Alice can examine are a subset ofL .11
In what follows we verify under which circumstances the dual is still the classical theory of probability.
Conversely, when we change the notion of being nonnegative, we can get weaker theory of probabilities.
Let LR denote a closed linear subspace of L that includes all constant gambles. By L ≥R =L
≥ ∩LR we
denote the subset of nonnegative gambles, and by L <R =L
<∩LR we denote the subset of negative gambles.
We thus relativise postulates A0–A2 as follows. Firstly, we restrict tautologies, and thus the extension of the
predicate being nonnegative, to the considered subspace.
AR0. L ≥R should always be desirable.
Secondly, we modify the deductive closure accordingly.
AR1. NR(GR) := clposi(L ≥R ∪GR).
Notice that NR(GR)⊆LR, for GR ⊆LR. In such case we sometimes denote NR(GR) by KR.
Hence, finally, we state that:
Definition 6 (Relative coherence postulate). A set KR ⊆LR is coherent relative to LR if and only if
AR2. L <R ∩KR = /0.
It is easy to check that T and its relativisation to LR defined by Postulates AR0–AR2, denoted by TR, are
fully compatible. That is:
Theorem 5. Let GR be a set of assessments inLR. NR(GR) is coherent in TR if and only if N(GR) is coherent in
T. Moreover NR(GR) =LR∩N(GR).
Finally, we compare inference in theory TR with inference in the classical theory T.
Let G be a finite set of assessment inLR, and NR(G ) be a coherent set of desirable gambles in TR. The lower
prevision of a gamble f ∈LR is defined as
ER( f ) := sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
f − γ01R−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈L ≥R ,
(44)
where 1R denotes the unitary gamble in LR, i.e., 1R(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. The upper prevision is denoted
as ER( f ) = −ER(− f ). Comparing (36) and (44), the reader can notice that f − γ01−∑|G |i=1λigi ∈L ≥ in (36)
becomes f − γ01R−∑|G |i=1λigi ∈L ≥R in (44).
Since the inclusion in L ≥ is a weaker constraint then the inclusion in L ≥R , we have that ER( f ) ≤ E( f ).
However, since LR is a linear subspace of L that includes all constant gambles, with L ≥R = L
≥ ∩LR, and
NR(G ) is coherent (in T), we therefore have that, for every f ∈LR
TR
ER( f ) =
T
E( f ) ≤
T
E( f ) =
TR
ER( f ),
meaning that ER( f ) can be interpreted as a lower expectation. In particular, this tell us that, from an operational
point of view, TR works exactly as T.
11 For example, in Finance the tradable gambles are usually piecewise polynomials. An European call option on the future value x of
an underlying security with strike k is mathematically expressed by the gamble max(x− k,0).
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The same can also be observed by looking at characteristics of the dual of a coherent set in TR. Indeed,
assumeLR is a closed subspace ofL . Then, endowed with the relative topology, the continuous linear functions
on LR are exactly the restriction to LR of the continuous linear functionals on L [55, Theorem 5.87]. As LR
includes all constant gambles, by the Riesz-Kantorovich extension theorem, any positive functional on LR can
be extended (possibly non uniquely) to a positive functional on L . This means that, given the correspondence
in Theorem 5, the dual of a set KR coherent in TR can be identified with the closed convex set of probability
charges (N(KR))•.
To conclude, whenever the subspaceLR is clear and Theorem 5 holds, we can identify T and TR.
S.6 P-coherence and Theorem 1
In what follows we provide some characterisation of P-coherence.
Proposition 6. Assume that Σ≥ is closed (and Σ< is not empty). Let G ⊆LR a set of assessments. The following
are equivalent
1. −1R /∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥)
2. posi(G ∪Σ≥)∩Σ< = /0
3. NB(G ) is P-coherent
Proof. Next, for the equivalence between items (1)-(3), first of all, notice that posi(G ∪Σ≥)⊆ clposi(G ∪Σ≥)⊆
NB(G ). Hence, (3) implies (2) implies (1). For the remaining implications we reason as follows. Assume that (2)
holds, and assume f +δ ∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥), for every δ > 0. This means f ∈ cl(posi(G ∪Σ≥)). Suppose f ∈ Σ<,
then since Σ< is open, f + δ ∈ Σ< for some δ > 0, contradicting P-coherence of posi(G ∪Σ≥). We therefore
conclude that f /∈ Σ<, and that (3) holds. Now, assume (2) does not hold, i.e. f ∈ Σ< and f ∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥).
Hence, − f is in the interior of Σ≥, meaning that for some δ > 0, − f − δ = g ∈ Σ≥. From this we get that
−1R = g+ fδ ∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥): (1) does not hold.
Analogously to T, one can ask if and when NB is a closure operator whose class of non-trivial closed sets
coincide with the P-coherent sets, or stated otherwise, if and when NB associates to each C⊆LR the intersection
of all P-coherent sets that include C. It turns out that we need to add some conditions to the structural properties
of T? to obtain such property:
Proposition 7. Assume that Σ≥ satisfies
(*) for every f ∈LR, there is ε > 0 such that f + ε ∈ Σ≥.
Let G ⊆LR a set of assessments. The following are equivalent
1. NB(G ) is P-coherent
2. NB(G ) 6=LR
Proof. Since (1) implies (2), we need to verify the other direction. Assume NB(G ) is not P-coherent. By
Proposition 6, −1 ∈ NB(G ), and thus −ε ∈ NB(G ), for every ε ≥ 0. Let f ∈LR. By (*) there is ε > 0 such that
f + ε ∈ Σ≥ ⊆ NB(G ). Hence, by closure under linear combinations, f + ε+(−ε) = f ∈ NB(G ).
Notice that condition (*) is satisfied by the P-coherent model T? of QM introduced in Section 3, as well as
by the model of Section 5. On the other hand, (*) is not the only condition to force the equivalence between the
two claims in Proposition 7. We plan for future work to study the natural condition on Σ≥ related to the property
for NB to be the closure operator induced by P-coherent sets.
In what follows, we prove the main theorem of the paper.
PROOF OF THEOREMS 1. Assume that LR includes all positive constant gambles and that Σ≥ is closed (in
LR). Let C⊆LR be a P-coherent set of desirable gambles. We have to verify that the following statements are
equivalent:
1. C includes a negative gamble that is not in Σ<.
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2. posi(L ≥∪G ) is incoherent, and thusP is empty
3. C◦ is not (the restriction toLR of) a closed convex set of mixtures of classical evaluation functionals.
4. The extension C• of C◦ in the spaceM of all charges inΩ includes only signed charges (quasi-probabilities).
First of all, notice that the restriction to LR of the set of all normalised charges that correspond to a bounded
linear functionals coincides with C•. Given this, the equivalence between (3) and (4) is immediate, whereas the
equivalence between (2) and (4) is given by Theorem 4. We finally verify the equivalence between (1) and (3).
In this case, the direction from left to right being obvious, the other direction is due to the fact that g ≤ f , for
every g ∈ C and f ∈ posi(L ≥∪C)\C.
The next result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a P-coherent set of desirable
gambles satisfying each claim of Theorem 1.
Proposition 8. Assume thatLR includes all positive constant gambles and Σ≥ is closed (inLR). The following
two claims are equivalent
◦ there is a P-coherent set of desirable gambles C ⊆ LR that includes a negative gamble that is not P-
negative
◦ Σ≥ (L ≥R
S.7 Duality in QT
Recall from Section 2.1 that the set {L ∈L ∗R | L(g)≥ 0, L(1R) = 1, ∀g ∈ C} is the dual of C⊂LR.
The monomials ⊗mj=1x j form a basis of the spaceLR. Define the Hermitian matrix of scalars
Z := L
(
(⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†
)
, (45)
and let {zi j} ∈ Cd , with d = n(n+1)2 and n =∏mj=1 n j, be the vector of variables obtained by taking the elements
of the upper triangular part of Z. Given any gamble g, we can therefore rewrite L(g) as a function of the vector
{zi j} ∈Cd . This means that the dual spaceL ∗R is isomorphic to Cd , and we can thence define the dual maps (·)◦
betweenLR and Cd as follows.
Definition 7. Let C be a closed convex cone inLR. Its dual cone is defined as
C◦ =
{
z ∈ Cd : L(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
, (46)
where L(g) is completely determined by {zi j} via the definition (45).
In discussing properties of the dual space, we need the following well-known result from linear algebra:
Lemma 1. For any M ∈ Hd×d and v ∈ Cd , it holds that
Tr(M(vv†)) = Tr((vv†)M) = v†Mv. (47)
By Lemma 1 and the definitions of g and Z, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 9. Let g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) and G Hermitian. Then for every z ∈ Cd , it holds that
L(g) = Tr(GZ), where Z is defined in (45).
The next lemma states that the only symmetry in the matrix (⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)† with x j ∈Cn j is that of being
self-adjoint.
Lemma 2. Consider the matrix
X = (⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†. (48)
Let Xst denote the st-th element of X then for all t ≥ s (upper triangular elements) we have that Xst =Xkl ∀x j ∈Cn j
iff k = s and l = t.
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We then verify that
Proposition 10. Let C be a P-coherent set of desirable gambles. The following holds:
C◦ =
{
z ∈ Cd : L(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0, Z ≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
. (49)
Proof. By P-coherence, C includes Σ≥, which is isomorphic to the closed convex cone of PSD matrices. We
have that
L(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0 ∀g ∈ Σ≥ ⊆ C.
From a standard result in linear algebra, see for instance [35, Lemma 1.6.3], this implies that Z ≥ 0, i.e., it must
be a PSD matrix.
In what follows, we verify that, analogously to Appendix S.3, the dual C◦ is completely characterised by a
closed convex set of states. But before doing that, we have to clarify what is a state in this context.
In a P-coherent theory, postulate A0 is replaced with postulate B0. Hence, to define what a state is, one
cannot anymore refer to nonnegative gambles but to gambles that are P-nonnegative. This means that states are
linear operators that assign nonnegative real numbers to P-nonnegative, and that additionally preserve the unit
gamble. In the context of Hermitian gambles, the unitary gamble is
1R(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j) =
m
∏
i=1
x j†x j = 1, (50)
where I is the identity matrix. Therefore, we want that
L
(
(⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j)
)
= L
(
Tr
(
I (⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†
))
= Tr
(
I L
(
(⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†)
))
= Tr(I Z) = Tr(Z) = 1.
(51)
Hence, the set of states is
SB = {z ∈ Cd :| Z ≥ 0, Tr(Z) = 1}. (52)
By reasoning exactly as for Theorem 3, we then have the following result.
Theorem 6. The map
C 7→ Q := C◦∩SB
is a bijection between P-coherent set of desirable gambles inLR and closed convex subsets of SB.
Hence, we can identify the dual of a P-coherent set of desirable gambles C, with the closed convex set of
states
Q= {z ∈ SB : L(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C} , (53)
which is equivalent to .
Notice that the matrices corresponding to states are density matrices, in fact (53) is equivalent to{
ρ ∈H n×n : ρ ≥ 0,Tr(ρ) = 1,Tr(Gρ)≥ 0, ∀G ∈ C} .
Hence, we can identify the set SB with the set of density matrices and denote its elements as usual with the
symbol ρ .
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S.8 Inference in QT
In this subsection, we extend to QT the results of Appendix S.2 and S.4 to derive lower and upper previsions of
a gamble f (x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†F(⊗mj=1x j) in QT. By definition of lower prevision, we have that
EB( f ) := sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
(⊗mj=1x j)†F(⊗mj=1x j)− γ01R(x1, . . . ,xm)−
|G |
∑
i=1
λi(⊗mj=1x j)†Gi(⊗mj=1x j) ∈ Σ≥,
(54)
the upper prevision EB( f ) =−EB(− f ). Note that the membership problem in (54) reduces to find γ0 ∈ R,λi ∈
R+ such that F− γ0I−
|G |
∑
i=1
Gi is PSD. The dual of the above optimisation problem is
EB( f ) := infρ∈SB
Tr(Fρ)
s.t :
Tr(Giρ)≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , |G |
(55)
Whenever a P-coherent C is maximal, its dual Q includes a single density matrix ρ˜12.
EB( f ) = EB( f ) = EB( f ) = Tr(F ρ˜).
Hence, in this case both the lower and upper prevision of the gamble f (x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†F(⊗mj=1x j)
coincide with Tr(F ρ˜). Note that in QT the expectation of f is Tr(F ρ˜).
S.9 Technicalities for Subsection 6.5.1
In this section we discuss how to exploit the correspondence with the system introduced in [44] in the aim of
deriving the remaining three axioms of QT.
Recall that a subset H n×n is said to be coherent if it is a convex cone C containing the set {G ∈H n×n :
G 0} of all PSD matrices inH n×n and disjoint from the interior of {G ∈H n×n : G≤ 0}. We know that there
is a bijective correspondence between closed convex sets of density matrices and coherent subsets of ofH n×n,
but also between closed convex sets of density matrices and P-coherent sets of gambles. By looking at such
correspondences, it is then immediate to verify that:
Proposition 11. The map f : C 7→ {G ∈H n×n | x†Gx ∈ C} is a bijection between coherent subsets ofH n×n and
P-coherent sets of gambles.
Based on this correspondence, we can thus exploit the results in [44] to derive Lu¨der’s rule (measurement
updating) and Schro¨dinger’s rule (time evolution).
S.9.1 Lu¨der’s rule
It states the following:
◦ Quantum projection measurements are described by a collection {Πi}ni=1 of projection operators that sat-
isfy the completeness equation ∑ni=1Πi = I. These are operators acting on the state space of the system
being measured. If the state of the quantum system is ρ immediately before the measurement then the
state after the measurement is
ρˆ =
ΠiρΠi
Tr(ΠiρΠi)
,
provided that Tr(ΠiρΠi)> 0 and the probability that result i occurs is given by pi = Tr(ΠiρΠi).
12This does not require |G | = ∞. Since ρ˜ is a matrix it can be uniquely specified by finite assessments of desirability ρ˜ = {ρ :
Tr(Giρ)≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , |G |}.
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A projection-valued measurement Π∗ = {Π∗i }ni=1 can be seen as a partition of unity {x†Π∗i x}ni=1. Thus an
event “indicated” by a certain projector Πi in Π= {Πi}ni=1 can also be seen as the function pii(x) := x†Π∗i x. The
information it represents is: an experiment Π is performed and the event indicated by Πi happens.13 Under this
assumption, Alice can focus on gambles that are contingent on the event Πi: these are the gambles such that
“outside” Πi no utile is received or due – status quo is maintained –; in other words, they represent gambles that
are called off if the outcome of the experiment is not Πi. Mathematically, we define Alice’s conditional set of
desirable gambles as follows.
Definition 8. Let C be an P-coherent set of gambles, the set obtained as
CΠi =
{
g(x) ∈LR | x†ΠiGΠix ∈ C
}
(56)
is called the set of desirable gambles conditional on Πi.
Notice that x†ΠiGΠix = αpii(x).
We can also compute the dual of CΠi , i.e., QΠi , and thus obtain the
Subjective formulation of Lu¨der’s rule:
Given a closed convex set of states Q, the corresponding conditional set on Πi is obtained as
QΠi =
{
ΠiZΠi
Tr(ΠiZΠi)
∣∣∣z ∈ Q} , (57)
provided that Tr(ΠiZΠi)> 0 for every z ∈ Q. Note that the latter condition implies that pi j(x) /∈ Q for any
j 6= i.
The following diagram gives the relationships among C,Q,CΠi ,QΠi .
C CΠi
Q QΠi
dual
conditioning
conditioning
dual
S.9.2 Time evolution postulate
It states the following:
◦ The evolution of a closed quantum system is described by a unitary transformation. That is, the state ρ of
the system at time t0 is related to the state ρ ′ of the system at time t1 > t0 by a unitary operator U which
depends only on the times t0 and t1, ρ ′ =UρU†.
Let us consider the dynamics of sets of gambles at present time t0 and future time t1 under the assumption
that no information at all is received during such an interval of time (i.e., we have a closed quantum system).
The focus is on characterising the coherence of sets of gambles in this time.
To this end, we add the following temporal postulate:
B3. A temporal P-coherent transformation is a map φ(·, t1, t0) from LR to itself that satisfies the following
properties:
(i) φ(·, t0, t0) is the identity map;
(ii) φ(·, t1, t0) is onto;
(iii) φ(L +, t1, t0) =L +;
(iv) φ(·, t1, t0) is linear and constant preserving.
13 We assume that the quantum measurement device is a “perfect meter” (an ideal common assumption in QM), i.e., there are not
observational errors – Alice can trust the received information.
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The rationale behind these conditions is the following.
Condition (i) is obvious.
Condition (ii) is a way of stating that sets of desirable gambles are only established at present time t0, since
any gamble g1 at time t1 corresponds to an element g0 at time t0.
Condition (iii) means that no further information is received from time t0 to time t1.
Finally, condition (iv) states in particular once again that the utility scale is linear.
By [44][Theorem A.9] and the fact that f is a bijection preserving coherence, the temporal P-coherence
postulate (B3) leads to the following:
Subjective formulation of the time evolution postulate of QT:
(1) All the transformations φ(·, t1, t0) defined above are of the following form
g(x)
φ
↪−→ h(x) = x†(U†GU)x,
for some unitary or anti-unitary matrix U ∈H n×n, which only depends on the times t1, t0 and is equal to
the identity for t1 = t0.
(2) The transformation φ(·, t1, t0) preserves P-coherence:
if C0 is P-coherent, then C1 = {g(x) ∈LR | x†(U†GU)x ∈ C0} is also P-coherent.
By exploiting duality, we can also reformulate the above results in terms of sets of states and derive the time
evolution postulate as a direct consequence of temporal P-coherence.
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